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Politics, power and unfair market concentration in the cocoa Global Value Chain (GVC):
Analysing the prospects of the Living Income Differential (LID) for achieving a just and
sustainable livelihood for cocoa farmers in Ghana
By Boakye Richard
Abstract: Ghanaian cocoa farmers confront many social and economic challenges and are
unable to pursue needed farm improvements because of insufficient and dwindling income.
The income of farmers is too low for them to generate enough capital to invest in
improvements in productivity or even more sustainable ecological practices. While various
initiatives exist aimed at eradicating the problem of child labour, promoting better farming
methods and ensuring access to agricultural inputs like fertilizer, sustainable credit and
financing, often overlooked is the centrality of guaranteeing a viable minimum price for
cocoa farmers, their families and workers, upon which other sustainable achievements in the
cocoa industry ultimately hinge. A guaranteed minimum price can play a key role in
combating the vicious cycle of poverty and social injustice by providing farmers with a living
income. Having a guaranteed minimum price can create a more stable social and economic
environment in which cocoa farmers can have the confidence to invest in their farms,
including the necessary and costly replanting of cocoa trees. Cocoa farming cannot be
considered fair, ethical or sustainable if it cannot provide a living income to the millions of
hardworking farmers and workers in Ghana. I will argue that the decision by the Government
of Ghana to initiate a guaranteed minimum price of $400 premium per tonne for cocoa is the
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CHAPTER ONE
1.0 INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Cocoa plays a pivotal role in the economic development of producing and consuming
countries. For producing countries such as Côte D’ Ivoire and Ghana, who grow more than
60 percent of the world’s cocoa beans, the cash crop remains an important source of revenue,
income and rural employment (Abbadi et al., 2019, p. 5; Vigneri and Kolavalli, 2018, p. 1). In
both countries, cocoa accounted for over 30 percent of export earnings from 1995-2014.
Moreover, globally, cocoa is produced by close to 6 million farmers and, in 2012, it provided
revenue for 40-50 million people, mostly in developing countries and particularly in the West
African sub-region (Kudom-Agyemang, 2020, para. 7; Voora, Bermudez and Larrea, 2019, p.
1; World Cocoa Foundation, 2012, as cited in Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 2). For most
farmers in Ghana and West Africa, cocoa is their primary source of income and livelihood,
without which life becomes extremely difficult. However, despite cocoa being an important
ingredient in the global confectionery, food and beverage industries, and more recently, in the
pharmaceutical and cosmetics industries, the majority of cocoa farmers live in desperate
poverty due to the extremely low farmgate prices they receive for the product of their labour.
This has led, over the years, to a vicious cycle of poverty and deprivation, creating labour
related risks to children and hired labour, especially women and girls, and environmental
degradation to cocoa growing regions (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 2).
1.1 BACKGROUND TO CASE STUDY: LIVING INCOME DIFFERENTIAL (LID)
In West African cocoa producing countries, the problem of low farmgate prices is largely
undermining the ability of cocoa farmers to earn a living income. Despite the global
chocolate market size being estimated to reach over $182 billion by 2025, cocoa farmers and
workers, the backbone of the industry, live in deteriorating social and economic conditions.
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After decades of sector-wide interventions and an increasing dialogue among key players in
the global cocoa-chocolate industry, the problems of extreme poverty, chronic child labour
and deforestation remain intractable in the cocoa sector. For example, the implementation of
certification schemes and standards for cocoa such as UTZ certified, Rainforest Alliance,
Fairtrade International and Organic, in addition to the adoption of commitments by consumer
countries to confront poverty and reduce child labour, have not achieved a substantial impact
on a broad scale, with the cocoa Global Value Chain (GVC) delivering unfair outcomes to
smallholder cocoa farmers in West Africa, who are unable to compete against the political
and economic power of well-structured cocoa buyers, manufacturers, marketers and retailers
at the global and national levels (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 2).
In response to this crisis in human development in the cocoa industry, government
representatives of the two major West African cocoa producing countries, Ghana and Côte
D’Ivoire, met in Abidjan, the capital city of Côte D’Ivoire, on 3rd July 2019, to announce a
fresh policy, aimed at raising farmgate prices and increasing incomes for cocoa farmers,
through price regulation. This new intervention is called the Living Income Differential
(LID). In attendance at the Abidjan meeting were also stakeholders and representatives of
lead firms in the cocoa marketing, processing and manufacturing industries including the
Hershey Company, Mars Incorporated, Blommer Chocolate, Cémoi, Sucden, Mondelēz,
Touton, Barry Callebaut, Cargill, Olam International, and Ecom Trading, who, after extensive
deliberations, were informed of the decision to implement the LID (Africa News, 2019;
Duncan, 2019; Du Venage, 2021; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019; Fair Trade
International, 2019; Maytaal, Ange and Nigel, 2019; Thompson; 2019).
The LID is a new pricing mechanism that fixes an additional premium of $400 per
metric tonne on all categories of cocoa bean contracts sold by the two countries beginning in
the 2020/2021 crop year, irrespective of the terminal market level. This $400 per metric tonne
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will be exclusive of the generic premiums of the respective countries that are paid based on
the origin and quality of the cocoa. In a joint communiqué signed on 16th July 2019 by Joseph
Boahen Aidoo, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD)
and Koné Brahima Yves, the Director General of Côte D’Ivoire’s Coffee and Cocoa Council
(CCC), both governments stated that, after lengthy deliberations with stakeholders at the
Abidjan meeting, the two countries “have implemented a floor price concept by instituting a
fixed Living Income Differential (LID) of $400 per metric tonne on every cocoa sold by
either country for the 2020/2021 season” (Yves and Aidoo, 2019, p. 1). They argued that the
LID would have a greater universal impact on easing farmer poverty than many of the
companies’ sustainability programs that help only small and select proportions of West
African cocoa farmers. Consequently, to resolve the problem of low farmgate prices among
cocoa farmers in their respective countries, they have decided that cocoa farmers must earn a
living income guaranteed by price regulation. For Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire, private brands
and other company initiatives have woefully failed to fulfil pledges of enhanced income for
farmers (Myers, 2020).
The LID means that, in addition to the terminal market price of cocoa beans, buyers
will now be required to add $400 to every tonne. Furthermore, a minimum of 70 percent of
Gross Freight on Board (FoB) price of $2,600, as the projected floor price, would be
legislated and paid to farmers in both countries. Notably, besides the LID of $400, which
would be added to the terminal market price on the international market, the minimum of 70
percent of Gross FoB price of $2,600 is a further policy reform both governments are
introducing at the farmgate level for their cocoa farmers, which works up to $1,820 per
metric tonne. It is the projection of both governments that the terminal market price in
addition to the $400 will push the Gross FoB price to $2,600. However, when the terminal
market price in addition to the $400 is under $2,600, both governments would have to cover
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the remaining balance in order to give their farmers a minimum of 70 percent of Gross FoB
price of $2,600. When the Gross FoB price at the end of the Cocoa Season is between the
minimum price level of $2,600 and $2,900, the farmer would be entitled to “Bonus”
payments and other investments in the cocoa sector. The amount and application of such
bonus payments and other investments will be determined by each country. When the Gross
FoB price is above $2,900, the excess proceeds will be placed in a Stabilisation Fund to be
established under the Ghana-Côte D’Ivoire Cocoa Initiative Secretariat. Both countries have
appointed external auditors, who will report to the Secretariat and determine the value of
payments to be made into the Stabilisation Fund (Yves and Aidoo, 2019, pp. 1-2). The
Ghana-Côte D’Ivoire Cocoa Initiative Secretariat is a joint industry body, which is aimed at
finding ways to improve the income of farmers, combat cross border smuggling of cocoa
beans and encourage further collaboration between the two countries (Admin, 2020, para. 2).
Furthermore, the $400 per metric tonne will be added to internal sales to factories in both
countries, which means that cocoa buyers and consumer countries cannot get around this
amount (Umeshiso, 2019, para. 46).
Since the introduction of the LID, private organisations such as the World Cocoa
Foundation (WCF), Fairtrade International and major chocolate companies in Europe and
North America including Nestlé, Mondelēz, Barry Callebaut, Ferrero, Cémoi and Blommer
Chocolate have publicly supported the initiative, stating that the LID represents a clear action
by the two major cocoa producing countries to drive change at the farmgate level. In a
statement issued by Nestlé, for example, the company stated that they strongly support any
price regulation by Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire that ensures cocoa farmers earn an income and
allows them to maintain a decent, adequate standard of living for themselves and their
families and workers. According to Nestlé, they were one of the first companies to buy the
2020/2021 cocoa with the LID. For her part, Cathy Pieters, the Director of Mondelēz’s Cocoa
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Life program, has fully supported the LID, stating that “we are totally embracing the LID-it is
baked into our strategic planning and we will pay for that” (Askew, 2020, para. 31).
Similarly, the President of the World Cocoa Foundation (WCF), Rick Scobey, speaking at the
WCF Partnership Meeting in Berlin in October 2019, endorsed calls for the implementation
of the LID. He stated that WCF company members are incorporating the LID into their
individual procurement programs for the 2020/2021 crop year. He explained that the LID is a
great opportunity for cocoa farmers to attain a living income, which is crucial to responsible
farming practices and wider sustainability goals in the cocoa sector, especially in Ghana and
Côte D’Ivoire (EPA Monitoring, 2019, para. 2).
Even though the announcement of the LID has received general support from key
industry players in the cocoa sector, it is worth noting that some lead firms in the global
chocolate industry including Mars Incorporated, Olam International and the Hershey
Company have raised concerns over its implementation, claiming the initiative will lead to
surplus production and may eventually prompt them to seek other sources of cocoa supply.
These chocolate companies have argued that the LID is a tool of a West African cartel
seeking to artificially inflate the price of cocoa. Therefore, it did not come as a surprise to
watchers in the global cocoa industry, when a media altercation ensued between the two
major cocoa producing countries, and Hershey and Mars Incorporated over the payment of
the LID. In a joint letter signed on 30th November 2020, Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire accused
the two lead firms of conspiring to derail and undermine the implementation of the LID. They
explained that the decision by Hershey to buy cocoa on the United States Futures market is an
indication that the company is evading the payment of the LID. Similarly, Côte D’Ivoire
accused Mars Incorporated of modifying its cocoa butter procurement to avoid paying the
LID. Speaking at the WCF Partnership Meeting in Bogotá in November 2020, Joseph Boahen
Aidoo stated that, “any brand that is seen not to be serious in accepting the LID by
5
mid-December 2020 must consider all its cocoa beans from Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire as
conventional. We are prepared to name and shame these brands” (Maytaal and Ange, 2020,
para. 7). To send a strong message to the world about their seriousness over the payment of
the LID, Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire withdrew their membership of a United States industry
association, which is the Cocoa Merchants Association of America (CMAA), accusing them
of condoning and conniving with American companies against poor West African cocoa
farmers. Moreover, Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire cancelled all sustainability programs operated
by the two companies, and threatened to suspend the purchasing licenses of any chocolate
maker who does not pay the LID. The two countries concluded their letter by reaffirming that
they would do “whatever is within our power to protect the over 3 million farmers from
impoverishment” (Almeida, Mieu and De Bassompierre, 2020, para. 6).
Prior to the introduction of the LID, every stakeholder in the cocoa sector generally
agreed that something was basically wrong in a context where, only 6 percent of the value of
chocolate went to cocoa farmers. Independent researchers, senior executives and
representatives of consumer and producer countries agreed that cocoa farmers needed a major
boost to achieve a living income. In effect, at the core of the living income challenge for
smallholder cocoa farmers lies a significant imbalance between the risks of cocoa production
shouldered by these farmers and their power to shape their own market participation within
the cocoa GVC (Oxfam, 2018, p. 3). Nonetheless, the question of living income has centred
mainly on the strategy stakeholders in the cocoa industry should develop towards the
attainment of this desired objective. As the Managing Director of the VOICE Network, which
is an association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Trade Unions working on
sustainability in cocoa, Antione Fountain, recently put it, when it comes to ensuring a living
income for cocoa farmers “it seems we are looking at everything except for how to raise
cocoa prices for farmers” (Nieburg, 2017, para. 10). While in recent times, some farmer
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cooperatives and major cocoa producing countries such as Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire have
argued that cocoa farmers can ultimately only achieve a living income guaranteed by price
regulation on the global market, other private organisations and companies, in contrast, have
maintained that cocoa farmers can achieve a living income through increase in productivity at
the farm level (Culliney, 2012).
For governments of producing countries like Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire, they make the
point that the problem of low farmgate prices experienced by cocoa farmers can be explained
by the unfair and imperfect nature of the cocoa GVC, where unequal market power and
dominance by chocolate lead firms characterise the distribution of value along the chain. A
significant proportion of the value generated along the cocoa GVC accrues to only a few lead
firms in Europe and North America to the disadvantage of smallholder cocoa farmers in West
Africa, who receive a disproportionate share of the value distributed. They insist that the only
way to counterbalance the growing political and economic dominance of lead firms, and thus,
guarantee fair prices for farmers, is for major cocoa producing countries to have a hand in
how prices are decided on the international market. For Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire, the
question of how to raise prices for cocoa farmers lies in the significance of a minimum
guaranteed price, instead of the misplaced focus on farm-level productivity (Culliney, 2012).
While considering improved productivity and farmer resilience to be important in their own
rights, the governments of Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire have come to the conclusion that,
ultimately, only price regulation will guarantee a viable living income for their cocoa farmers.
Countering this argument, other private organisations and companies have advocated
for cocoa farmers to earn a living income through improved farm-level productivity. They
make the point that insufficient farmer income is due to the low levels of farm productivity in
the cocoa sector. With improved production methods and the promotion of crop
diversification, farmers will be able to increase cocoa yields per hectare, expand income
7
options and consequently, secure more viable long-term livelihoods. Along these lines, the
WCF, which is a non-profit international organisation helping to improve sustainability in
cocoa, has introduced a program called the Cocoa Livelihoods Program (CLP). The CLP
seeks to increase the income of cocoa farmers through enhanced farm-level productivity,
efficient service delivery and increased farmer resilience. The CLP, which includes extension
services and farmer training, envision that, for farmers to earn a viable living income,
farm-level production should be increased to at least 1000 kilograms per hectare, compared to
what is happening currently in most producing countries, which is about 400-600 kilograms
per hectare (World Cocoa Foundation, 2019, para. 1). For some private players in the cocoa
sector, the question of how to raise prices for cocoa farmers lies in increasing productivity at
the farm level, which in turn assists them to achieve a living income.
1.2 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM
The problems of low farmgate prices, hazardous child labour and deforestation have led
multiple stakeholders in the cocoa sector to introduce different initiatives as a way of
confronting those challenges. For example, the use of certification schemes and standards for
cocoa such as UTZ certified, Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade International and Organic are
more common in cocoa than with most agricultural commodities sold worldwide. Private
companies have also launched their own initiatives relating to worker’s rights and
sustainability issues. For example, the WCF organises “Cocoa Action”, which brings together
leading cocoa and chocolate industries, producer governments and key industry players in the
cocoa sector around issues of cocoa sustainability (Brack, 2019, p. 18). Furthermore, a
number of consumer-country governments are starting to adopt commitments targeted at
reducing deforestation in cocoa regions by establishing regulations that ensure standards for
sustainability produced cocoa (Brack, 2019, p. 19).
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In general, however, there is increasing acceptance that existing initiatives on cocoa
are not achieving their targets in either economic, social or environmental respects. Existing
initiatives have not been able to achieve significant impact on a broader scale, with the cocoa
GVC delivering unfair results to most smallholder cocoa farmers because only a few lead
firms have the power to decide how value is distributed among the various actors within the
value chain. For instance, cocoa organisations have been talking about low farmgate prices,
child labour, and deforestation for decades now without substantial action to address them.
As a result, it is widely accepted that certification schemes alone cannot be a sustainable
solution to the problem in the cocoa industry because these systems place an unfair burden on
cocoa farmers to achieve sustainability without offering much in terms of reward, in
particular sufficient and viable prices (Brack, 2019, p. 21). In light of the limitations of
existing initiatives, the Governments of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire have put in place the LID,
which would directly affect world prices by creating a minimum guaranteed price based on
living income estimates.
Prior to the LID, the world price of cocoa had long been established on a terminal
market known as the cocoa futures market. Cocoa is a relatively homogenous commodity,
which is traded worldwide. This allows us to speak of a global cocoa market establishing the
world price for cocoa. Pricing in the world market critically depends on ICE Futures Europe
(London) and the ICE Futures United States (New York) as points of reference (Gilbert,
2016, as cited in Oomes et al., 2016, p. 20; International Cocoa Organisation, 2020, p. 1). For
Oomes et al. (2016), to explain this connection, it is important to differentiate between
exchange prices and transaction prices. The price of a cocoa future (exchange prices) is the
price for a financial contract involving the forward delivery of a specific quantity of cocoa.
Transaction prices, on the other hand, are set mutually between buyers and sellers for the
actual delivery of cocoa. In the world cocoa market, these transactions are negotiated on the
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two major exchanges. Oomes et al. (2016) state that such contracts leave significant room for
negotiation so that different cocoa buyers and processors will end up paying different prices
for cocoa of the same quality, depending on their trading expertise, the timing of delivery and
market power. Therefore, there is no single spot price for cocoa on the futures market, which
is problematic in terms of providing stable and viable income to smallholder farmers (Gilbert,
2016, as cited in Oomes et al., 2016, p. 31). For example, the December 2020 prices for
cocoa decreased by 8 percent from $2,283 to $2,107 per metric tonne on the ICE Futures
Europe (London), whereas, on the ICE Futures United States (New York), prices dropped by
7 percent from $2,509 to $2,338 per metric tonne (International Cocoa Organisation, 2020, p.
2).
To address the problem of low farmgate prices, my thesis will explore this new policy
of a guaranteed minimum price and examine the following research question: how viable is
the initiative of a guaranteed minimum price for meeting the objective of a living income for
reducing poverty and social injustice among farmers in the cocoa industry in Ghana? Beyond
contributing to the body of knowledge on price regulation and developments in cocoa
generally, and the impact of the LID for reducing poverty and injustice among cocoa farmers
in Ghana, the study will highlight the political and social factors influencing such a decision
by the state. It seeks to ascertain whether the LID policy by Ghana will meet the objectives of
fair income, reduce the incidence of child labour and address environmental concerns. The
study will deepen understanding on the significance of a mandated minimum price for
achieving sustainability in the cocoa sector, and hopefully stimulate further debate on the
need to find sustainable means of cocoa production and living incomes for millions of cocoa
farmers in West Africa.
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1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research design for this thesis focuses on a case study approach, exploring the decision
by the Government of Ghana to implement the LID, which will enable cocoa farmers achieve
a living income guaranteed by price regulation. The research methodology included
interviews and focus group discussions. I made sense of the data by using content analysis to
analyze and verify the results. The principles of confidentiality, avoidance of asking very
sensitive questions, and being open and honest about the purpose of the research were
adhered to at all stages. The empirical basis of this study was both primary and secondary
data. Primary data came from interviews and focus group discussions; specifically, I
interviewed forty (40) participants engaged at various levels of the cocoa sector in Ghana,
irrespective of gender or ethnicity. Participants were state and non-state officials from: the
Food, Agriculture and Cocoa Affairs Committee of Ghana's Parliament, Ghana Cocoa Board
(COCOBOD), Agricultural Journalists, Ghana National Cocoa Farmers Association
(GNACOFA), Members of the Academic community (the Department of Economics,
University of Ghana) and Cocoa Farmers, across the six cocoa growing regions of Ghana.
The secondary sources of data included media publications, news articles, peer-reviewed
articles, research papers, and papers presented by scholars. The secondary information was
used to complement the primary data in order to enhance the validity, veracity and reliability
of the findings through triangulation. The results from the interviews were transcribed and
analysed using content analysis.
Again, my lived experience and social context has enabled me, as a researcher, to
understand most of the human development challenges within the cocoa sector in Ghana. I
worked as a Purchasing Clerk (PC) for close to three years in a small cocoa growing
community called Kyebi-Amanfrom in the Eastern region, one of the six cocoa growing
regions of Ghana. In the course of my stay and travel across the community, I became
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conversant with the deprivation of cocoa farmers in terms of the lack of access to basic social
amenities such as food, water and shelter. Further, children of cocoa growing families in the
community had to stay out of school because of the lack of money to pay school fees and buy
school books, and importantly, cocoa farmers in the community did not have the financial
support to purchase the needed farming inputs such as fertilizer and improved seedlings for
their cocoa business. Therefore, from my lived experience of Kyebi-Amanfrom, cocoa
farmers lived in extreme poverty because the prices they received from the sale of cocoa were
woefully inadequate to cater for the welfare needs of their families and workers.
1.4 SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY
There are limitations to the study including time and resource constraints, and insufficient
documentary evidence for the purpose of this research. All these are foremost problems in the
path of the researcher in the process of carrying out this arduous task. Perhaps, the main
limitation of the research is that the LID project has only just begun, and therefore, I am
unable to immediately measure and assess its full impact on cocoa farmers, as well as track
prices over time. Moreover, another limitation is that because it is a case study, which
explores the LID in Ghana, the findings from the research cannot be readily generalized and
applied to other settings. However, the benefits of the research, as a preliminary investigation
into the LID, is the need to immediately assess this new policy intervention and decide where
it might head from here and make useful proposals moving forward.
1.5 CURRENT CHALLENGES IN GHANA’S COCOA SECTOR
1.5.1 Low farmgate prices in Ghana
For many farmers in Ghana, the income from cocoa is woefully insufficient to enable them to
generate enough capital to invest in increased yields or in more sustainable agricultural
practices. Cocoa farming families in Ghana make below the United Nations’ $1.9 definition
of extreme poverty, earning on average $1.34 per day, with a quarter of this amount coming
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from non-cocoa sources (Peyton, 2019, para. 8; Slavin, 2020, para. 32). Terry Slavin (2020)
explains that, even though certification schemes by Rainforest Alliance, UTZ certified and
Fairtrade International (FLO) have increased the income of some cocoa farmers, it does so
only marginally. While Rainforest Alliance and UTZ certified do not make public their
premiums, farmers whose cocoa are certified by these schemes earn on average $1.40 per
day. Cocoa farmers certified by Fairtrade International, which pays a global fixed floor price
for cocoa of $2,400 per metric tonne, earn $1.54 per day (Slavin, 2020, para. 32). Thus, even
with the implementation of different certification schemes and standards, cocoa farmers are
still earning income far below the international poverty line.
According to the International Cocoa Initiative (2017), which is a non-profit
foundation that promotes child protection in cocoa growing communities in Ghana, there are
several factors that affect cocoa farmers’ capacity to earn higher income. The majority of
cocoa farmers in Ghana, for example, operate small-scale farms of 2-4 hectares. Because
farm sizes are small, the cocoa that is harvested is often small, at an average of 0.42 tonnes
per hectare (para. 3). Furthermore, cocoa farmers find it difficult to access extension services,
which could assist them in enhancing farming techniques and increasing yields. Low yields
reduce the level of income generated by farmers and prevent them from having enough
savings (International Cocoa Initiative, 2017, para. 3). Moreover, the high costs of
production, including high cost of agricultural inputs, affects the income of cocoa farmers.
The costs associated with buying fertiliser, farming equipment and pesticides put a large
financial burden on their overall income (International Cocoa Initiative, 2017, para. 4).
According to the International Cocoa Initiative (2017), of the 29 cocoa growing communities
that they work with in Ghana, only 36 percent of farmers can afford to purchase farming
inputs of any kind (para. 4).
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Similarly, Antonie Fountain, Paul Elshof, Dick de Graaf and Friedel Hütz-Adams
(2014) state that, the FoB price given to cocoa farmers, which is the price of a tonne of cocoa
once it is loaded on a ship in the producing nation’s port for export is unpredictable, varies on
a daily basis, and tends to be even lower during the major harvest seasons (p. 1). Thus, the
percentage of the FoB the cocoa farmer in Ghana receives is not only unstable, but also
differs every crop season because the world market prices of cocoa have been established on
a terminal market that allows cocoa buyers and processors to pay different prices for cocoa
depending on delivery time and market expertise. None of these producer price calculations
takes into consideration the basic needs or expected net income of cocoa farmers. The
seasonality of cocoa farming suggests that incomes are extremely erratic and cocoa farmers
face increased economic vulnerability and heightened poverty during the lean season
(Fountain, Elshof, De Graaf and Hutz-Adams, 2014, p. 1). Few cocoa farmers are able to
save money from their cocoa business and many cannot afford resilient economic strategies
such as insurance coverage, pension schemes or other alternative income sources. In most
instances, cocoa farmers borrow money to cover household expenses and agricultural inputs
for approaching crop seasons, despite the fact that sustainable credit and financing and other
means of technical support are limited in these rural cocoa communities.
In this situation of low farmgate prices and low income, women, engaged in cocoa
farming are often the worst affected and the most vulnerable, as they have to take on
additional labour by balancing cocoa farming with other income-generating endeavours such
as producing oil palm, sewing, and maintaining chicken farms to meet needs for food, school
fees and healthcare for household members (Fair Labour Organisation, 2014, p. 16;
International Cocoa Initiative, 2017, para. 5). The Fair Labour Organisation (2014) explains
that because women have fewer opportunities in any process within the cocoa supply chain in
terms of higher income and better farming inputs, their productivity level generally remains
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low; thereby, making their social and economic conditions worse than male counterparts (p.
8).
1.5.2 Hazardous Child Labour in Ghana
Another major challenge that is a symptom of the low farmgate prices received by cocoa
farmers in Ghana is hazardous child labour, which is common through much of the cocoa
supply chain. The poor economic viability of cocoa farming makes this illegal practice of
employing children worse and unresolvable. Low prices make it difficult for cocoa farmers to
break the existing poverty trap, and young adults abandon the cocoa growing communities to
migrate to urban centres in search of sustainable, and better paying jobs, cutting down
significantly on the supply of rural workers. This lack of human capital in these cocoa rural
areas makes farmers more reliant on children, particularly young boys and girls, which in the
end aggravates rural poverty by preventing children from accessing quality education
(Gneiting, 2019, para. 4). Aside from that, it is also the case that most cocoa farmers do not
have money to pay for the services of adult labourers to help them grow and maintain their
farms.
According to the Food Empowerment Project (2020), a project that seeks to prevent
unfair working conditions among farmers and workers, many of the children working on
cocoa farms are between the ages of 12 and 16, although a study conducted during the
2018/2019 crop season, by the National Opinion Research Centre (NORC), University of
Chicago, indicates that children working in cocoa can be as young as 5 years (Myers, 2020).
Forty percent of children who work in cocoa are girls, who either stay on the cocoa farms for
a few months or end up working on the cocoa farms throughout adulthood (para. 5).
Luckstead et al. (2019) point out that, almost 92 percent of the children working in the cocoa
sector in Ghana in 2015 were involved in hazardous work (p. 1). This involves the use of
dangerous tools such as machetes and cutlasses, as well as exposure to toxic agricultural
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chemicals that many are forced to work with deep into the night. Children as young as ten
years old have been documented spraying cocoa pods with poisonous agro-chemicals without
any personal protective equipment provided by the farm owners (Food Empowerment
Project, 2020, para. 8). According to a report released by the Payson Centre for International
Development and Technology Transfer in 2014 titled “Survey on child labour in West
African cocoa growing areas,” there is a lot of work to be done to eliminate child labour in
the cocoa sector. The report states that 1.5 million children need to be taken out of hazardous
work in the cocoa sector by 2020 to meet the Framework of Action of the Harkin-Engel
Protocol, which is an international agreement aimed at reducing the worst forms of child
labour by 70 percent across the cocoa sectors of Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire. At present, both
countries have failed to meet this objective. For the Payson Centre for International
Development and Technology Transfer, this objective is difficult to achieve because
smallholder farmers are always in need of more cocoa income to cover basic household
expenses (Payson Centre for International Development, 2014, p. 86).
1.5.3 Deforestation and Poor Governance Structures in Ghana
Another consequence of low farmgate prices is the problem of land and environmental
degradation. Extreme poverty forces farmers to plant cocoa in protected areas and virgin
forests amid declining produce from aging trees, lack of Good Agricultural Practices (GAP),
and a general reduction in suitable land area due to climate change (para. 4). The need for
cocoa farmers to sustain their livelihoods has driven deforestation in protected areas, creating
additional risks to cocoa farmers and their workers, and often leading to human rights abuses
stemming from forced and violent evictions (Fountain and Hütz-Adams, 2018, p. 17). Forest
clearance in protected areas has a negative ecological impact on cocoa yields, as such areas
usually suffer from lower soil fertility, erosion and erratic rainfall patterns (Brack, 2019, p.
13). Although, sustainability programs aim to increase farmer income by growing cocoa on
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less land, a Report by the World Bank (WB) demonstrates that many cocoa farmers are far
below the poverty line, and thus, even if they are trained in GAP, or offered financial and
technical support, not every farmer will be able to take up these options (para. 11). For
example, Slavin (2020) states that, in research conducted by the Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) Mighty Earth and Lumina Intelligence, more than two years after the
cocoa industry signed the Cocoa and Forest Initiative (CFI) with the Government of Ghana
(GOG), deforestation-free cocoa was still elusive in the country. Notwithstanding 34
companies, which make up 85 percent of global cocoa usage, signing up to the CFI, since its
launch at the 24th Conference of Parties (COP) climate summit in Bonn in November 2017,
deforestation has worsened in cocoa growing countries because of the desire for cocoa
farmers to increase their meagre income and attain a decent standard of living (Slavin, 2020,
Para. 1 and 2).
In addition to these challenges is the problem of bad governance and inefficient law
enforcement, which contributes to many of the problems in the sector. Ineffective ownership
rights over land and forests in Ghana is a major problem. In practice, trees are owned by the
state, not the cocoa farmer; thus, cocoa trees may be cut down if the government allocates the
area to, for instance, a timber concessionaire. Subsequently, this undermines the motivation
for cocoa farmers to allow natural tree regrowth on their farms because the value of these
trees will belong to the government (Brack, 2019, p. 14). In many cocoa growing areas, clear
land tenure is more difficult for women to attain, who find it difficult to obtain the right to be
landowners due to patriarchal traditions. Even though women do a lot of the work in cocoa
production, men are generally assigned the role of decision makers on the farms. Unclear
land tenure systems, moreover, can lead to lower investments in farms, and even if
investments are secured, it is uncertain the land will remain with cocoa farmers, as farmers
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might choose to fell cocoa trees or to diversify production (Fountain and Hutz-Adams, 2018,
pp. 18-19).
1.6 CONCLUSION
Many stakeholders in the cocoa sector, including the VOICE-Network, have explained that
living income should be the starting point of any conversation on farmer income. They insist
that every cocoa farmer should be able to earn a living income, and preferably a lot more.
Considering this objective, many discussions in the cocoa sector have centred around which
approach better helps cocoa farmers achieve a living income. While some key players in the
cocoa sector contend that cocoa farmers will achieve a living income guaranteed by price
regulation, others insist that cocoa farmers will achieve a living guaranteed by
productivity-driven programs. My thesis explores the introduction and implementation of the
LID, with a focus on Ghana. Based on my investigations, I argue that the governments of
Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire have critical roles to play in regulating prices on the global cocoa
market, if, indeed, their farmers are to achieve a viable living income. My argument is that
the LID challenges the assumptions in the cocoa sector about the ability of stakeholders,
particularly, producing governments to transform the way cocoa is priced and traded to the
benefits of cocoa farmers. The LID is now an economic lifeline for cocoa farmers, who
otherwise would have continued to be held hostage by giant Transnational Corporations
(TNCs). Research on the cocoa GVC indicates that market concentration and power
imbalances are glaring and expansive within the value chain such that countries like Ghana
and Côte D’Ivoire have only limited options to influence prices at the expense of a few,
dominant giant lead firms in Europe and North America. To address the problem of excessive
power and dominance within the cocoa GVC, I contend that every cocoa farmer in Ghana
should earn a living income guaranteed by price regulation. Fairness, social justice and other
sustainability achievements in the cocoa sector in Ghana ultimately depend on the centrality
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of guaranteeing a viable minimum price for smallholder cocoa farmers and workers. The
implementation of the LID is central towards the attainment of this goal.
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CHAPTER TWO
2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This chapter discusses the theoretical framework and historical considerations of the study.
The Global Value Chain (GVC) approach is presented as the theoretical framework that
guides the study. In this chapter, I argue that, although the West African region dominates in
the production of cocoa beans, the processing, manufacturing, retailing and consumption of
the final products of cocoa are largely done in Europe and North America, where a greater
share of the value is also retained. The cocoa GVC involves the operation of five major
segments. The first segment is cocoa beans production, which further involves three stages:
cocoa growing, harvesting, and fermentation and drying. The second is the sourcing and
marketing segment, involving the export of cocoa beans from the farmgate level to the export
market. The third segment involves processing of cocoa beans into other finished products,
and encompasses two stages: grinding and roasting. The next segment comprises chocolate
manufacturing and distribution, and remains the most valuable segment of the cocoa GVC.
The final segment is retailing to final consumers, involving packaging, commercial marketing
and retailing.
2.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE GVC APPROACH
According to Stefano Ponte, Gary Gereffi and Gale Raj-Reichert (2019), the GVC refers to
the complete range of activities that lead firms, farmers and workers undertake to bring a
product from its conception to it final use. These activities include production, processing,
distribution, marketing, finance and consumer services. Within the GVC, these functions are
distributed among different lead firms scattered around the world. Lead firms are groups of
firms that operate particular functional positions along the value chain, and therefore, are able
to influence what is done along the chain and by whom, at what price, using what standards,
to which specifications and at what point in time a particular commodity is delivered (Gereffi
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and Fernandez-Stark, 2016, p. 7; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000,
as cited in Lessmeister, 2008, p. 144; Ponte and Sturgeon, 2014, as cited in Ponte, Gereffi and
Raj-Reichert, 2019, p. 1).
The emergence of GVC, as a concept and analytical framework, has enabled
researchers to understand the changing dynamics of the global economy. The GVC approach
was postulated in reaction to neoclassical trade theory, which claims that firms have valuable
and rare assets, which they deploy in independent market exchanges with other firms.
According to neoclassical trade theory, market power and concentration is important for firms
because it leads to the extraction of new profit opportunities, which in the end makes them
more competitive and efficient (Tavassoli, Saeedi and Biglari, 2018, p. 4). In critiquing the
neoclassical trade theory, GVC thinkers argue that economies, especially those of developing
countries, must recognise that market power and concentration in value chains are not just
coordinated spontaneously through market exchanges, but emerge out of deliberate and
calculated strategies and decision making by specific actors, particularly giant “lead” firms in
Europe and North America to manage and control their access to final markets globally
(Ponte, Gereffi and Raj-Reichert, 2019, p. 1).
A GVC approach is a compelling methodological framework for documenting,
evaluating and analysing the impact of social movements on corporate governance structures.
It has moved, over the years, from highlighting the economic decisions of transnational lead
firms to placing more emphasises on a range of institutions, from social movements, labour
unions and industry associations to cultural values, legal standards and industry codes. A
GVC approach enables the researcher to include social movement theories in their research
designs to examine how movements concerned with issues such as social justice, the
environment, fairness and ethics can pressure corporations and introduce new forms of
economic corporation (Fridell, 2019, p. 253). Further, it examines relationship between
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economic agents, particularly transnational firms and the flow of value from developing
countries to developed ones along the global chain (Fridell, 2019, p. 256). For example, the
GVC approach has been employed by individuals, governments, private actors, NGOs, as
well as the International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO), the World Bank and the European
Commission to explore market power and concentration within the cocoa GVC and its impact
on smallholder farmers and workers in major cocoa producing countries (Gayi and Tsowou,
2016).
Mostly, the research method used in a GVC approach is the case study approach,
comprising a single or several cases in comparison. The focus of the case study is mostly a
specific value chain or agents within the chain. The case study approach allows for
examination of a unique case “as a whole” embedded in its particular social, political and
historical context (Fridell, 2019, p. 254). For instance, comparative case studies have mostly
been used in GVC literature, which has compared different chains to develop and expand
typologies and conceptual frameworks (Bair, 2009; Talbot, 2004, 2009, as cited in Fridell,
2019, p. 254). Christopher Gilbert (2006) and Raphael Kaplinsky (2004) have used a GVC
approach to examine the similarities and differences in high market power and concentration
of the cocoa and coffee value chains, arguing that, in both value chains, there is significant
growth in market concentration, primarily from the downstream processing ends of the chains
to the final consumer.
According to Raphael Kaplinsky (2004), when it comes to the GVC, producers of
commodities are connected to final markets in one of two ways. On one side of the spectrum,
they take part in what is called “perfect markets” in much economic literature, in which they
have little influence. Thus, they are price-takers rather than price-makers; their decisions are
not influenced by those of particular competitors; and their relationships along the chain are
short-term and impersonal. On the other side of the spectrum, when the transaction-costs of
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markets are very high, production is internalised within a single firm, which is exemplified in
its activities through a series of links in the production chain (Kaplinsky, 2004, p. 3).
Nevertheless, during the last quarter of the twentieth century, a new type of organised
production began to progressively dominate, especially as these production chains became
international in nature. On one hand, these production chains were not internalised within a
single firm, since intermediate inputs were passed along the chain by parties with unequal
market links. On the other hand, the relationships that took place in this intermediate
processing were neither impersonal nor short-term, but durable and reflected close
cooperation among participating producers (Kaplinsky, 2004, p. 3).
However, the “link” holding the producers in these emerging chains together did not
reflect equal market weight and opportunities. In each of these chains, one or more key actors
came to exert undue power and control, and are known as “chain governors”. Thus, there
emerged two dominant types of chain governance: producer-driven and buyer-driven chains
(Kaplinsky, 2004, p. 4). In producer-driven value chains, giant, usually transnational
manufacturers play central roles in coordinating production networks. These large
manufacturers coordinate activities within the value chain and take responsibility for helping
their suppliers and consumers to be more efficient. Producer-driven value chains are typical
of capital and technology-intensive industries such as automobiles, aircraft, computers,
semiconductors and heavy machinery. On the other hand, in buyer-driven value chains,
retailers, marketers and branded manufacturers play pivotal roles in setting up decentralised
production networks in a variety of exporting countries, typically located in developing
countries. These chains are typical for labour-intensive industries and consumer-goods
industries, and are highly relevant to developing countries because buyer-driven chains
provide ready markets for their goods and services. Examples include: the agro-food
industries, textiles, garment, footwear and furniture (Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003, p. 3).
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The cocoa GVC can be understood within the context of a buyer-driven value chain,
where lead firms including retailers and branded manufacturers have integrated the activities
of marketing, distribution, export and processing in ways that enable them to capture much of
the value added in marketing associated with domestic and global markets. Their ability to
exploit the economies of scale through marketing and transportation, corporate consolidation,
branding and diversification of consumption have changed power relations in the cocoa GVC
to their advantage at the expense of smallholder cocoa farmers (Ponte, 2001, as cited in
Traoré, 2009, p. 27). In effect, only a few lead firms in Europe and North America exert
power and control over the determination of prices and obtain high margins. Lead firms in the
cocoa GVC are not only merging or acquiring new deals with other smaller firms within the
value chain, they are also exploring new profit opportunities including expanding their
activities into different segments of the cocoa GVC, from sourcing cocoa beans to now
producing chocolate products. This phenomenon increases the bargaining power of leads
firms at the expense of important cocoa producing countries such as Ghana and Côte
D’Ivoire, finding it difficult to influence prices for their farmers, despite their huge market
share (Hütz-Adams and Schneeweiß, 2018, p. 11). While the cocoa GVC is increasingly
being concentrated in the hands of a few lead firms, cocoa farmers remain dispersed, unable
to hold countervailing power against well-structured cocoa buyers, processors,
manufacturers, marketers and retailers at the global and national levels (Gayi and Tsowou,
2016, p. 2). In effect, the main issue within every stage of the cocoa GVC is who has the
power and influence to decide who gets what, when and how.
According to Samuel K. Gayi and Komi Tsowou (2016), the cocoa GVC is
characterised by a structural configuration, involving a high level of vertical integration and
significant horizontal concentration at different successive stages within the value chain.
These captive structures give rise to the exercise of unequal power in cocoa purchasing both
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at the farmgate and at the global levels, which leaves limited room for cocoa farmers to cover
production costs and provide themselves with a decent livelihood (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p.
13). Thus, there is adequate evidence, looking at the structural disparity of the cocoa GVC, to
conclude that there is a causal connection between negative changes of farmer’s share of
world prices and changes that occur at the international level because of the penetration of
foreign capital and excessive market concentration. Hence, an extremely powerful and
limited number of lead firms, at present, dominate and control all segments of the global
cocoa market. For example, in 2012, only five companies: Olam International, Cargill, Barry
Callebaut, Armajaro Trading Limited and Cémoi bought over 50 percent of the cocoa beans
in Côte D’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroun and Togo (Oomes et al., 2016, p. 11).
An analysis of the cocoa GVC demonstrates that lead firms have made substantial
cost savings and profits from their huge market power and concentration patterns at all
segments of the cocoa value chain. In the view of neoliberal institutions like the World Bank,
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), concentration patterns in the GVC enable firms to become more
efficient and benefit from the economies of scale. They argue that these activities enable
companies to consider relative cost and build an effective value chain across different firms
and locations (OECD, 2013, p. 7). This notwithstanding, for Gayi and Tsowou (2019), the
debate on the GVC approach, particularly in the cocoa sector, should rather centre on whether
concentration patterns have benefited farmers, who are less integrated and widely dispersed
in the cocoa value chain. They point out that the extent to which cost savings resulting from
concentration patterns in the cocoa GVC has been passed onto cocoa farmers is highly
questionable. The low profitability of the cocoa farming business and the poor living
standards of cocoa farmers is enough compelling evidence to show that market power and
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concentration in the cocoa GVC is largely a self-serving agenda for a few lead firms, seeking
to consolidate their control and influence within the value chain.
2.2 HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE COCOA GVC
According to Kristy Leissle (2018), the cocoa tree, Theobroma cacao, is indigenous to
Central and Southern America; however, centuries of globalisation have spread its cultivation
across the world to other regions where it can be viably grown, which is about 20 degrees
north and south of the equator. The consequence is that, today, most cocoa grows outside of
the Americas. West Africa is by far the dominant producer region with farmers there growing
around three quarters of cocoa globally. Côte D’Ivoire, the largest exporter typically accounts
for 40 percent. Ghana, the second largest, controls around 20 percent, and Nigeria and
Cameroun about 5 percent. Countries in South America produce less than one fifth of the
world’s total, and the Asia Pacific region, owing to Indonesia, which is the third largest
exporter of cocoa in the world, produces about a tenth (Leissle, 2018, p. 16).
Leissle (2018) explains that, for more than a century now, at least one West African
producer has been among the top global cocoa exporters, starting with São Tomé and
Príncipe, the second largest after Ecuador in 1900. Starting about 1911, Ghana (then known
as the Gold Coast) became the leading exporter of cocoa, a position it maintained until Côte
D’Ivoire surpassed it in the late 1970s. Because four of the leading producer countries are in
West Africa, the region is an indicator of cocoa’s trading prices and general market trends
(Leissle, 2018, p. 18). Market analysts must pay close attention to West Africa’s seasonal
weather and long-term climate changes, as well as its political environment. These factors
drive how much cocoa the region produces, and how difficult or easy it is to get the cocoa
loaded onto container ships and headed to Europe and North America, which dominate in the
processing of cocoa beans and final consumption. Leissle (2018) observes that, as the largest
exporter of cocoa, the supply from Côte D’Ivoire is essential. Ghana is also important for
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both supply and quality, because it produces the world’s best bulk beans, whose flavours lie
at the heart of what many European and North American consumers know and love as
chocolate (p. 18).
According to Leissle (2018), in 2016, the value of all cocoa traded globally was about
$12 billion. At the same time, the total sale of the finished goods that come from cocoa,
mostly chocolate, was about $100 billion. She points to the fact that five companies- Mars
Incorporated, Mondelēz, Ferrero, Nestlé and Hershey, who are all headquartered in the
United States and Europe, sell more than half the world’s branded chocolate by value. Their
huge economies of scale mean that these companies and the people who control them enjoy
far higher profit margins than smallholder cocoa farmers in producing countries. Though they
are unable to grow cocoa commercially, countries in Europe and North America enjoy the
greatest economic benefits from cocoa because of the unequal and imbalanced power
relations within the cocoa GVC. One way to measure this unequal power relationship is to
look at grindings, the term for processing cocoa beans into more usable and valuable forms.
The processing of cocoa within the GVC is concentrated in the hands of few processors
globally, with Barry Callebaut, Cargill, and Olam International, grinding nearly two-thirds of
the world’s cocoa beans. In effect, Europe remains the leading region with regard to cocoa
processing, as most of the world’s cocoa processing happens in the Netherlands and
Germany. Outside of the European region, the United States has the largest processing
capacity (Leissle, 2018, p. 19).
Further, Leissle (2018) explains that another way of unpacking cocoa’s value is to
look at where people eat chocolate. Switzerland leads in total market value of chocolate, with
the highest per capita rate of chocolate consumption in the world. On the opposite end, West
African producer countries are estimated to capture just two percent of chocolate’s $100
billion global market value. In 2011, for example, Germany exported processed chocolate
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products worth $3.8 billion, with no West African country in the top 10 exporters of
chocolate in the world (Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2015, p. 3). Moreover, retailers,
grocery stores, restaurants, pharmaceuticals and bakeries in Europe and North America make
billions of dollars on chocolate sales. As a result, while chocolate manufacturers receive 35.2
percent of the value of a $1 chocolate bar, and retail and taxes take up 44 percent, cocoa
farmers and workers earn just 6.6 percent (Fountain and Hütz-Adams, 2015, as cited in
Nieburg, 2015, para. 3).
Essential to understanding value in the global cocoa industry has been the historical
emergence of processed cocoa to finished goods. Leissle (2008) makes the point that
Mesoamerican societies had been putting cocoa beans to different use for more than three
millennia before Europeans encountered cocoa, which included using cocoa for drinks,
currency and rituals. A major shift occurred, in the nineteenth century, as technologies
emerging out of the Industrial Revolution, which started in Britain and spread to the regions
of Europe and North America, made possible a radically new consumable form of cocoa
called the “chocolate bar” (p. 19). Chocolate, as Leissle (2018) describes, “was a rectangle,
glossy and sweet, and wrapped in packaging that gave it a brand identity” (p. 5). As a result
of being the earliest to industrialize and mass-produce bar chocolate, North America and
Western Europe today are the “mature” chocolate markets, and not West African cocoa
countries, who produce its raw material.
Leissle (2018) makes the point that, despite the unevenness, and huge income
discrepancy between cocoa farmers and chocolate manufacturers, dependency characterises
both ends of the supply chain. Whereas processing capacity and consumer markets are rising
in some producer countries, they still export most of their cocoa beans as primary agricultural
commodity. The world’s six million growers of cocoa, who are dispersed and not well
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integrated within the cocoa GVC, depend on a few lead firms and consumers overseas to
purchase, process and consume their crops.
At the same time, lead firms owe their existence to cocoa. Even though two of the
three largest processors have diversified product ranges and do not depend exclusively on
cocoa, all major processors and chocolate manufacturers are headquartered in countries that
cannot grow cocoa on a commercial scale because cocoa is predominantly grown in the
tropics. These companies, therefore, depend on millions of cocoa farmers and workers, and
the transportation systems in Côte d’ Ivoire and Ghana especially, in addition to the labour of
women and children, who provide them with unpaid domestic support to cultivate the raw
material they need most (p. 20).
Unfortunately for these lead firms, observes Leissle (2018), there is no substitute for
cocoa. The chemical composition of the seed and complexities of chocolate manufacture
have meant that so far artificial imitation of chocolate’s flavour has proven impossible. The
only ‘replacement’ that appears with any frequency, mostly in health food stores, is carob,
which Leissle (2018,) characterises as a “legume indigenous to the Mediterranean region and
it must be admitted requires some imagination to accept as chocolate analogue” (p. 20) This
makes the cocoa beans unique and rare, peculiar to only a few regions in the World.
World Cocoa Bean Production (ICCO, 2017/2018 Crop Season)
Continent Production (tonne) Percentage
Africa 3,493,100 75%
Americas 818,700 18%
Asia and Oceania 326,600 7%
Total 4,638,400
Figure 1: The International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO), as cited in Tromba (2019)
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2.3 ORGANISATION OF THE COCOA GVC
This section examines the different nodes within the cocoa GVC by explaining what is done
at every node, who governs it and where value is retained. The cocoa GVC has five major
segments, namely: production; sourcing and marketing; processing; manufacturing and
distribution; and retailing to final consumers (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 10).
2.4 PRODUCTION OF COCOA BEANS
First, there is the cocoa beans production segment of the cocoa GVC. This segment is
governed by major producing countries in West Africa, where over six million hectares of
cocoa trees are cultivated, and the region accounts for about 70 percent of total world
production. Côte D’Ivoire and Ghana are the largest producers, followed by Nigeria and
Cameroon (Wessel and Quist-Wessel, 2015, p. 2). In 2016, for example, the largest producer
of cocoa beans was Côte D’Ivoire ($3.9 billion), followed by Ghana ($2.5 billion) and
Nigeria ($0.8 billion) (Voora, Bermudez and Larrea, 2019, p. 1). The cocoa beans production
segment of the cocoa GVC has three stages: cocoa growing, harvesting, and fermentation and
drying.
2.4.1 Cocoa growing
Cocoa growing is predominantly undertaken by smallholder farmers, who account for 80-90
percent of global production. These farmers generally cultivate small hectares of land, which
is typically between 2-4 hectares. Cocoa beans are the seeds of the “Theobroma Cacao”,
which produces different varieties including the Forastero, Trinitario and Criollo. Cocoa trees
thrive in tropical areas, within a range of 10-20 degrees north and south of the equator under
the protective shade of other plants such as plantain, banana and palm trees. Further, cocoa
trees begin to flourish and bear pods from the fifth year of their life and there is a higher
investment cost in replanting because cocoa tree growth is less rapid and requires more
labour and farming inputs (Ruf and Zadi, 1998, para. 11). In recent times, some advances in
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breeding have enabled farmers to grow new species of cocoa trees, which are able to bear
fruits in their third year. Although cocoa trees can live up to 100 years, most are productive
for about 20-30 years (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 10).
2.4.2 Cocoa harvesting
Cocoa is harvested manually when the cocoa pods are ripe to avoid injuring the junction of
the stem with the tree, as this is where future flowers and pods will emerge (Dand, 1997).
Damaging the cushion of the cocoa tree serves as a potential point of entry for fungi. The
process of harvesting consists of cutting the pods usually with a sharp instrument such as a
machete or a cutlass. During the harvest season, cocoa farmers rely on a combination of
household, hired and communal labour for the majority of activities. For poorer households,
they may choose not to have additional labour and try to make do with household labour,
even if it means the use of children for some activities (Bymolt, Laven and Tyszler, 2018, p.
162). Generally, the harvesting seasons of cocoa depend on the planting areas. In Ghana, for
example, there are two harvesting seasons made up of the main crop season and the light crop
season. The main crop season begins in October and ends in April, while the light crop
season begins in June and ends in August (Owusu-Amankwah, 2015, p. 48).
2.4.3 Cocoa fermentation and drying
The third stage of the cocoa production segment is cocoa fermentation and drying. Cocoa
beans are fermented and dried on the farm or at home in most cocoa growing villages of
producer countries. After the cocoa pods are harvested, the pulp covering the beans are
removed and stored in boxes or baskets or heaped into piles and covered with mats or with
banana or plantain leaves. After the fermentation of the cocoa beans, the beans are dried in
the sun, for several days- typically five to ten days. The drying stops the fermentation process
and enhances the storability of the cocoa beans. Even though some countries choose to use
machines in drying cocoa beans, sun drying is considered the best as it produces a better
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flavour and quality. Sun drying is the natural means of drying beans in the sun on raffia mats.
Cocoa farmers in major producing countries prefer this method because it is simple and
cheap, but it is also labour intensive and there is much concern for stable weather (Mossu,
1992). Without proper aeration, the acid present in the beans does not escape completely,
resulting in more acidic cocoa products (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 11).
2.5 MARKETING OF COCOA BEANS
Second, there is the cocoa beans marketing segment of the cocoa GVC. Historically,
marketing of cocoa beans from the farm gates to export markets is governed by national
commodity boards in most major producing countries such as Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana and
Cameroun. Even though the specific functions of these national cocoa marketing boards
differ across producing countries, in general, these boards purchase cocoa beans from farmers
at fixed price and act as principal sellers or exporters. However, with the introduction of
trade liberalisation reforms in all three countries in the 1980s and 1990s including
liberalisation of cocoa bean markets, cocoa farmers can now sell their crops directly at
buying stations to agents of exporters or to traders and brokers, who usually use prices of
cocoa beans futures on international markets, as references. These prices are denominated in
the US dollars, Pound Sterling, and until recently, Euros. Once the cocoa beans are bought,
most of them are transported to roasting and grinding plants in consumer countries in Europe
and North America. Before cocoa beans are exported to consumer countries, local buyers in
producing countries transport them first to an exporting company, which inspects the cocoa
beans, then grades and stores them into burlap, sisal or jute bags for shipment to the
importer’s warehouse. At the port of destination, the importer may conduct additional quality
checks before storing or selling the beans to cocoa processors or chocolate manufacturers
(Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 11).
32
2.6 PROCESSING OF COCOA BEANS
The next stage involves the cocoa beans processing segment of the cocoa GVC. This segment
is governed by importing countries in Europe and North America because of the development
of new processing technologies and grinding installations, developments in transport (bulk
shipping), and the ability of these processing companies to buy cocoa beans in large volumes
and source from a variety of countries (Kaplinsky, 2004, p. 21). The processing segment
typically encompasses two stages: roasting and grinding (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 12).
Currently, four big chocolate companies: Barry Callebaut, Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland
(ADM) and Blommer Chocolate control over 61 percent of global cocoa grindings (Gayi and
Tsowou, 2016, p. 14).
2.6.1 Roasting
Cocoa is roasted to reduce the water content and obtain rich aroma and flavours from the
beans. Roasting can be done on the whole beans, which comprises the nib and the shell,
before the shells are removed. This process of roasting the whole beans is called bean
roasting. Alternatively, roasting can be done only on the nib after the shells are removed. This
process is called nib roasting. In some cases, the shells that are removed from the nibs are
sold and used as agricultural mulch or fertilizer, and thereby, providing opportunities for the
development of cocoa by-products. After the beans are roasted, they undergo other processes,
including alkalisation using alkaline solutions such as potassium and sodium carbonate. The
use of alkaline solutions result in semi-finished cocoa products being darker and with less
acidity. Further, time and temperature for roasting cocoa beans are key determinants of the
flavour of semi-finished cocoa products (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 12). Cocoa roasting is an
expensive stage for cocoa manufacturers because this process affects the quality and quantity
of finished products such as butter and cocoa liquor at the manufacturing segment. Thus,
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cocoa manufacturers invest a lot of technology, time and laboratory research in roasting in
order to maintain the quality of final cocoa products (Mounjouenpou et al., 2018, p. 22).
2.6.2 Grinding
After the cocoa beans have been roasted and shelled or shelled and roasted, the nibs are
grinded to produce cocoa liquor under high pressure. Cocoa liquor can be used instantly as an
ingredient for chocolate. Otherwise, it is pressed through a fine sieve or by using extraction
solvents to obtain other products like cocoa butter. After the extraction of the cocoa butter,
there is a solid material which is left behind called cocoa cake or presscake. The extracted
cocoa butter is then filtered and stored in tanks in liquid form for use in chocolate
manufacturing. On the other hand, the cocoa cake is either broken into smaller pieces and
sold in cocoa markets or milled to produce a fine cocoa powder. Cocoa cake generally differs
in terms of fat content depending on how much fat has been pressed out. This determines its
end use ranging from chocolate drinks to bakery products and fillings (Gayi and Tsowou,
2016, p. 12).
2.7 MANUFACTURING OF CHOCOLATE
The chocolate manufacturing segment of the cocoa GVC is predominantly governed by
industrialized countries in Europe such as Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom. In North America, industrial production of chocolate is mainly done in the
United States and Canada. Countries in the Global North dominate in the manufacturing of
chocolate because of their control over financial resources and vital manufacturing
technologies, involving considerable research and development. Importantly, chocolate
manufacturing is the most valuable segment of the cocoa GVC. In 2019, the chocolate market
size was worth over $138 billion and it is projected by industry watchers to reach $182 billion
by 2025 (Business Wire, 2020, para. 1). Mars Incorporated, the Ferrero Group, Mondelēz,
Meji Company Limited and the Hershey Company are the top five global chocolate
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manufacturers, with combined chocolate industry net sales of $61billion in 2019 (Chocolate
Industry Market Share, 2020, para. 3). In this segment, cocoa liquor and butter are mixed
with inputs such as sugar, vanilla and other creaming agents and milk. This mixture then
undergoes a refining process through a series of rollers until a smooth chocolate is obtained.
Moreover, there is an additional process called conching, which ranges from a few hours to
several days to further develop the flavour and texture. The resulting mixture, which is called
industrial chocolate or couverture, is shipped in tanks in both liquid or solid forms, or
alternatively, it is tempered and poured into moulds for distribution and utilisation by the
downstream industrial players of the chain including confectioners, dairies, and bakers. In
some cases where manufacturers have diversified their production into other areas of the
value chain, the industrial chocolate is used in-house to produce consumer products (Gayi
and Tsowou, 2016, p. 13).
2.8 RETAILING TO FINAL CONSUMERS
The chocolate retailing segment of the cocoa GVC is the final step in the cocoa-chocolate
value chain and includes packaging, commercial marketing and retailing. Similar to the
manufacturing segment, this segment is governed by industrialised countries in Europe and
North America because of their dominance over sales, marketing and financial services. In
2017, the chocolate industry had a global retail market value of $106 billion and is expected
to grow to $190 billion by 2026 (Voora, Bermudez and Larrea, 2019, p. 1). Chocolate
products are sold through grocery retail channels including hypermarkets, supermarkets,
convenience stores, discounters, and more recently, online shopping. Furthermore, some
chocolate manufacturers are now opening their own branded retail stores to improve their
image and capture a larger consumer base. Chocolate retailing can be grouped into types,
sales and geographic location. First, chocolate types include dark, milk and white chocolate.
Second, chocolate sales include every day, premium or seasonal chocolate. Finally,
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geographic locations of the sale of chocolate include North America, Europe, Asia and the
rest of the world. Each category is important because it provides specific market
opportunities in terms of consumer buying behaviour (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 13).
2.9 CONCENTRATION IN THE COCOA GVC
In almost all of the cocoa GVC segments, there is an increasing presence of horizontal
concentration and vertical integration because of a market structure in the global cocoa
industry that promotes a number of mergers and acquisition deals. Moreover, market
concentration in the cocoa GVC is not only limited to the global level, but also occurs in
many cocoa producing and chocolate consuming countries.
2.9.1 Horizontal Market Concentration at the Global level
There are three segments of the cocoa value chain where this phenomenon of horizontal
concentration is mostly observed. These segments are cocoa marketing, cocoa processing and
retail of chocolate products (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, pp. 13-15).
First, there is the phenomenon of horizontal market concentration in cocoa marketing.
From the 1980s to the early 2000s, the number of cocoa marketing houses in London dropped
from 30 to less than 10. This was because companies with broadly diversified marketing
interest, including Cargill and ADM, took over the role of some companies specialised in
cocoa marketing such as Gill and Dufus, Berisford and Sucden (UNCTAD, 1999, as cited in
Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 15). The market concentration pattern has increased over the
years due to mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, in 2013, the biggest cocoa marketing and
processing companies- Barry Callebaut, Cargill and ADM- traded between 50 and 60 percent
of the world’s cocoa production (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 14). Further, an important driver
of market concentration in the marketing segment of the cocoa value chain is trade
liberalisation reforms that took place in the 1980s in producing countries. Whereas it was
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argued that trade liberalisation would increase competition in domestic intermediation and in
the export of cocoa beans by raising the number of players, in reality, the high costs of
operation, including high transport costs in the domestic markets of cocoa producing
countries, contributed to strengthening the position of lead firms, who have better access to
financial and technological resources than small traders and buyers in the developing
countries. Consequently, most small players were taken out of cocoa marketing channels or
merged with other lead firms (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 14).
Second, there is the phenomenon of horizontal market concentration in cocoa
processing. Since 2006, only four companies: Barry Callebaut, Cargill, ADM and Blommer
Chocolate Company have controlled about 50 percent of world cocoa grindings. Currently,
the four companies control about 61 percent of the cocoa processing segment within the
cocoa GVC. Due to high costs of production including high machinery, fuel and electricity
costs, independent processing companies are unable to make enough savings, resulting in
smaller profit margins for most of them (Hardman & Co., 2014, as cited in Gayi and Tsowou
2016, p. 14). To address these high costs, companies have used mergers and acquisition
strategies in the processing segment of the cocoa GVC as a means of lowering production
costs. In effect, because of the capital-intensive nature of the cocoa processing segment, only
financially powerful companies engage in it. Potential new entrants and small companies,
lacking the financial and technological resources, are discouraged from participating in cocoa
processing, especially those in cocoa producing countries in West Africa (Gayi and Tsowou,
2016, p. 14).
Third, there is also a high degree of market concentration in the retailing of chocolate
products. Previously, chocolate companies sold their products in their home countries and
most of them were owned by family firms. At present, a number of confectionery and
branded chocolate companies operate in global markets, some of them still family-owned
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brands like Mars Incorporated and the Ferrero Group, which are among the top five
manufacturers of chocolate bars globally. In 2019, Mars Incorporated made over $18 billion
chocolate industry net sales, followed by Ferrero with $13 billion chocolate industry net
sales, Mondelēz with $12 billion net sales, Meji with $10 billion and Hershey’s with $8
billion (Chocolate Industry Market Share, 2020). This means that, in 2019, nearly half of the
chocolate industry total sales went to only five companies, which is $61billion. Further, some
chocolate manufacturers such as Mars Incorporated and the Ferrero Group are now opening
their own branded retail stores, a phenomenon that has led to increased brand exposure and
image enhancement, and in turn, significantly improved the share of big chocolate companies
along the cocoa GVC (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 15). For example, Mars Incorporated has
the largest branded retail business in the chocolate industry, with branded retail stores in
North America, Europe and Asia, including New York, Las Vegas, London and Shanghai,
considerably increasing their share of value along the cocoa GVC (Mars Incorporated, 2020,
para. 7; Wilson, 2020, para. 11).
2.9.2 Vertical Market Concentration at the Global Level
Many companies in the cocoa GVC are expanding their activities into other segments, which
were previously not controlled by them. Currently, cocoa-chocolate companies are engaged
in all segments of the cocoa GVC, from sourcing cocoa beans to producing chocolate
products. In the past, a number of huge chocolate producers used to manage a large part of
the cocoa value chain themselves, from purchasing cocoa beans to processing cocoa butter
and powder to finally making chocolate (Gilbert, 2009, as cited in Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p.
15). As such, many chocolate business entities positioned themselves on a specific segment
of the cocoa value chain (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 15). However, since the late 1980s, an
increasing number of mergers and acquisitions has resulted in a high degree of vertical
integration in the cocoa industry. This vertical integration stems partly from the motivation of
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lead firms in Europe and North America to gain tighter control and financial power over
cocoa and chocolate products to satisfy demand in terms of quantity, quality and traceability
(Menard and Klein, 2004, as cited in Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 15).
The operations of marketing and processing companies have extended to the farmgate
levels directly, by setting up cocoa-buying stations, and indirectly, by designating other
people to buy cocoa on their behalf. This fight for dominance within the cocoa GVC has
created a blurred boundary between marketing and processing companies, as the big
marketing lead firms are now engaged in cocoa processing, while cocoa processing
companies are, at the same time, engaged in cocoa marketing. Out of the eight largest
companies, which control about 70 percent of global cocoa processing, seven of them are
now playing important roles in the cocoa GVC in terms of cocoa origination, handling and
marketing (Hardman & Co., as cited in Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 15). Companies such as
ADM and Cargill, who traditionally were marketers of cocoa beans, have now diversified
their activities within the cocoa GVC into grindings and production of cocoa liquor, powder,
butter and chocolate manufacturing; thus, achieving significant vertical integration (Gayi and
Tsowou, 2016, p. 15).
Furthermore, other companies have increased their activities in different segments of
the cocoa GVC from production of semi-finished cocoa products to cocoa beans sourcing on
one hand, and to consumer chocolate production on the other. For example, Barry Callebaut
and Blommer Chocolate Company, who used to specifically process cocoa beans and produce
semi-finished cocoa products for chocolate producers, have now moved from sourcing cocoa
beans to the production of chocolate bars. Conversely, large chocolate producers and brand
owners such as Nestlé and Mars Incorporated have now moved into sourcing cocoa beans
from farmers directly. Therefore, due to these vertical integration patterns in the cocoa GVC,
only a few companies remain that have operations in a single, specific area of the value chain.
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Companies that still engage primarily or exclusively in trading cocoa beans include Continaf
BV, Novel Commodities and Touton at the international level, while at the country level
Saf-Cacao operates in Côte D’Ivoire, Akuafo Adamfo in Ghana and Roig Agro-Cacao SA in
the Dominican Republic (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 16).
2.10 MARKET CONCENTRATION AT THE REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LEVELS
Apart from the market concentration that is observed in the cocoa value chain at the global
level, market concentration also happens at both the national and the regional levels. In many
cocoa producing countries, a small number of companies, either domestically owned or
brokers for large firms, account for large market shares, and as a result, decide prices for
smallholder farmers.
In most of the cocoa producing countries, marketing channels for cocoa beans are
controlled and dominated by a limited number of players. In Côte D’ Ivoire, for instance,
only three international companies: Olam International, Cargill and Barry Callebaut, through
their local brokers bought 50 percent of the cocoa produced during the 2011-2012 crop
season. In Ghana, for example, Barry Callebaut, recently acquired Nyonkopa, a Licensed
Buying Company (LBC), which is authorised to buy cocoa directly from farmers. According
to Barry Callebaut, these types of acquisition align with its ambition to gain access to
individual farmers in addition to farmer cooperatives. Aside from formal linkages with local
firms, there are also informal relations that connect local activities to lead firms in the cocoa
sector. For example, local exporters sometimes depend on multinationals for funding and in
practical functions as shippers for cocoa processors (UNCTAD, 2008, as cited in Oomes et
al., 2016, p. 13).
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According to Gayi and Tsowou (2016), there is also increased market concentration in
the national markets of chocolate consuming countries, which is driven predominantly by the
importance of global brand recognition and commercial marketing strategies (UNCTAD,
2008, as cited in Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 16). This means that the huge investments
required for new competitors to promote their brand could constitute a serious impediment to
market entry, particularly for small players. Additionally, like the cocoa processing segment,
the chocolate manufacturing segment is also capital-intensive, which requires huge financial
investments by new competitors. These political and economic factors have resulted in a few
chocolate producing companies enjoying significant shares within the value chain. In France,
for example, the major chocolate confectionery companies in 2014 were the Ferrero Group,
who had 19 percent of the market shares, Lindt and Sprungli had 13 percent, and Nestlé and
Mondelēz had 11 percent each. In the United States, the chocolate confectionery market is
highly diversified in terms of suppliers including transnational corporations and national,
regional and local companies. This notwithstanding, the top two chocolate producers namely
Hershey and Mars Incorporated accounted for 65 percent of sales in the U.S in 2014. For
instance, none of the new entrants in the chocolate sector in the U.S was able to go beyond 5
percent market share in 2014 (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, pp. 16-17).
2.11 LESSONS FROM THE COCOA GVC AND ITS IMPACT ON FARMERS
Within the cocoa GVC, market concentration has two dimensions: horizontal and vertical. A
critical examination of both dimensions demonstrates increasing power imbalances, creating
a dire situation of a monopolistic behaviour, where a few and powerful lead firms in Europe
and North America have control of four segments of the cocoa GVC because of their vital
dominance over technology, transportation, financial and marketing resources. While some
argued that trade liberalisation and economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s would enhance
competition in domestic intermediation and in the export of cocoa beans by increasing the
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number of players, in reality, the high costs of operation including the high cost of energy and
transportation in major producing countries like Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire have contributed to
further strengthening the position of lead firms, who have taken control of the cocoa GVC
through mergers and acquisitions, whereas others have extended their activities into segments
that were not within their core domain. This has increased the bargaining power of giant and
well-integrated lead firms to the disadvantage of small actors such as smallholder farmers
(Dobson et al., 2001; Godwin, 1994; Menkhaus et al., 1891, as cited in Gayi and Tsowou,
2016, p. 18). As a result, increasing concentration within the cocoa value chain has raised the
dangers of anti-competitive practices including price agreements, and hidden or formal
collusive behaviour among these lead firms (Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 18).
While there is considerable market concentration in the marketing, processing,
manufacturing and retailing segments, the cocoa production segment remains fragmented
among scattered smallholder farmers and local traders, who mostly operate small-scale farms
of 2-4 hectares (International Cocoa Initiative, 2017, para. 3). The end result is that cocoa
farmers are entrenched in weak bargaining positions, which reduces them to small and remote
price-takers, who in addition have limited access to credit and financing, market information
and agricultural inputs including improved seeds and fertilizers (International Labour Rights
Forum, 2014, as cited in Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 18). Furthermore, increased
concentration in cocoa marketing in exporting countries, especially in Ghana and Côte
D’Ivoire, has reduced competition of cocoa buyers. Although market concentration has
resulted in efficiency and higher profits for lead firms in the cocoa sector, the extent to which
cost savings resulting from efficiency and market concentration patterns in the cocoa GVC
has been passed on to farmers in major producing countries is highly disputed. The main
objective behind the market power and concentration is for lead firms to continue to expand
their profit opportunities, while exploring new ones. This compelling evidence of power
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imbalances and social injustice within the industry, tilted heavily against the interests of
smallholder farmers, points to the need to examine a guaranteed minimum price for cocoa
farmers, on which sustainability in the cocoa industry ultimately only hinges. My argument is
that the LID is currently an economic lifeline for cocoa farmers, who otherwise would have
continued to be held hostage by these giant cocoa and chocolate lead firms in Europe and
North America. Therefore, the LID cannot, in any respect, be described as a tool of a West
African cartel when, indeed, giant chocolate companies including retailers and branded
manufacturers in the cocoa GVC are allowed such monopolistic dominance in the free market
economy, in which they have integrated their activities of marketing, distribution, processing
and export in ways that enable them to exploit and control a substantial share of the value
added in marketing associated with national and international markets to the complete




3.0 INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This section covers the research design and methodology. It explains the research objectives
and provides an appropriate methodology for achieving those objectives. The primary
objective of the study is to examine the significance of the LID for reducing poverty and
injustice among cocoa farmers in Ghana, and for creating sustainable cocoa farms and supply
chains for the future. The topics examined here include sampling techniques, methods of data
collection and approach to data analysis. The research made use of data collection from two
sources offering primary and secondary data. In the area of primary sources, data was
obtained by interviews and focus group discussions. Secondary sources of the research were
employed using news articles, media publications, editorials, peer-reviewed articles and
research papers by academics.
3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION
In most GVC studies, the method employed by researchers has been the case study approach
involving a single case or several cases. The focus of the case studies is typically a specific
value chain or agents and a project or initiatives within the chain. The case study approach
allows for the broad investigation of a distinct case, which is embedded in its political, social
and historical context. When used comparatively, case studies provide a frame of reference to
make statements about generalities or uniqueness of complex structures and processes and to
develop explanatory and theoretical arguments (Nissen, 1998; Steinmetz, 2004, as cited in
Fridell, 2019, p. 254). Comparative case studies have mostly been employed in the GVC
literature, which has compared different chains to create and expand typologies and
conceptual techniques (Fridell, 2019, p. 254).
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The dominant method of investigation has usually involved qualitative research based
on a combination of interviews and focus group discussions, document analysis (mostly a
systematic reading of codes of conduct, industry publication, consumer magazine,
institutional reports or media coverage), participant observation, data mapping and archival
research. Whereas few works explicitly state the exact nature of their comparative methods,
most use what is called “constant comparative method” (Thomas, 2016, as cited in Fridell,
2019, p. 254). This comprises continuous reading of data and analysis, comparing elements,
coding them and creating core concepts and themes (Fridell, 2019, p. 254).
3.2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH APPROACH: A CASE STUDY
3.2.1 Purposive sampling and Validity
A case study approach allowed me to be purposive about my data collection, strategically
selecting forty participants, who have in-depth knowledge, experience, and are directly
involved in the cocoa GVC in Ghana. Participants were able to help me explore questions
around value and income, and where it flows within the cocoa value chain. For this study,
participants included state officials, Members of Parliament, agricultural journalists,
academics, executives of cocoa farmer groups, cocoa purchasing clerks and cocoa farmers
themselves. When I interviewed Members of Parliament (MPs) in Ghana, based on the
purposive sampling technique, I focused on Members of Parliament serving on the Food,
Agriculture and Cocoa Affairs Committee. The MPs selected are either cocoa farmers or have
their constituencies located in major cocoa growing communities in Ghana. A purposive
sampling technique enabled me to keep to the theme and focus of my study, and thus, avoided
over-generalisation. Moreover, purposely selecting participants from different backgrounds
allowed me to cross check the validity and reliability of the information provided by one
informant against that provided by the other informants in the cocoa GVC.
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3.2.2 Flexibility
A case study approach allowed me to use interviews to solicit direct information from
participants within the cocoa value chain, especially from cocoa farmers. With the support of
a structured interview guide, I had the flexibility to organise and plan questions, and in some
instances, ask follow up questions and engage in discussion beyond the initial script
depending on where the interviewees wanted to direct the discussion further. Non-response to
questions were generally low, as participants highlighted the centrality of a guaranteed
minimum price to the sustainability of the cocoa sector. The interviews with key actors in the
cocoa value chain made clear that smallholder farmers in the cocoa GVC are fundamentally
assigned to the role of remote and small price takers. The nature of the cocoa GVC is such
that farmers are unable to attain higher and fairer prices for their output. Therefore, the value
chain is balanced against the social and economic interest of smallholder farmers and cannot
bring about a just outcome without price regulation on the international market.
3.2.3 Contextualization
A case study approach allowed me to contextualize the discussions on the benefits and
challenges of the decision by Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire to institute a guaranteed minimum for
cocoa farmers, locating the issue in its wider historical and political economy context. The
implementation of the LID is significant within the context that it will protect smallholder
farmers from the power imbalances and unfair market concentration in the cocoa GVC.
Through various news articles, media publications and editorials, I was able to assess the
response of key actors within the cocoa value chain including the response of major
cocoa-chocolate lead firms. My analysis shows that, while some lead firms in the cocoa
GVC, especially Mars Incorporated, the Hershey Company and Olam International, argue
that the LID is a tool of a West African cartel to drive up the price of cocoa, major cocoa
producing countries such as Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire, on the other hand, contend that the
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LID is central to protecting their farmers against the growing dominance of these lead firms,
whose agenda is to enhance their profit base while exploring new ones.
3.2.4 Triangulation
A case study approach allowed me to triangulate multiple data sources including news
articles, peer-reviewed articles, books, research papers and institutional reports from the
World Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Prior to the introduction of the LID and even after its implementation in the 2020/2021 crop
season, various joint press statements, communiqués and letters were issued by Ghana and
Côte D’Ivoire, as well as those issued by lead firms in the cocoa-chocolate industry either
supporting or denouncing the implementation of the LID. Through numerous news articles
and media publications, I was able to triangulate these documents, which allowed me to
verify all the different sources: interviews, news media and government statements. For
instance, I could ascertain the validity and veracity of what interviewees said by triangulating
them with other data such as media reports and news publications. Moreover, a case study
approach allowed me to complement these secondary data sources with my interviews and
focus group discussions. In effect, I made sense of the data by using content analysis to
analyse, triangulate and verify the results.
3.3 DATA COLLECTION
Information gathered from my interviews were handwritten and tape-recorded with the
consent of the interviewees. Participants’ involvement ended with the interview, unless they
requested a summary of the final results by email by consenting to be re-contacted and
providing an electronic address. Questions progressed from general to specific using an
interview guide, which was prepared ahead of the interview. Ethical issues, particularly
confidentiality, were addressed and insured. Before the interview ended, participants were
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asked whether they had anything to add. The interviewees were told that they would be
further contacted in case there are aspects of the interview that remain unclear.
3.4 CONCLUSION
In carrying out this research, I strove to consider all core ethical issues. In particular, the
involvement of participants was done on a strictly voluntary basis. I assured interviewees of
complete confidentiality, as this was explicitly stated in the informed consent form and the
verbal consent script. I told participants that the interview exercise is strictly for academic
purpose, and that, direct quotes and summaries of the interview will be used to write this MA
thesis and any other academic work such as papers for publication in academic journals,
newspapers, magazines, blogs, conference presentations, reports, research grant applications,
and books. Participants may have their interviews withdrawn from the study at any time after
the initial interview. Besides that, they can determine any future involvement with the study
and may withdraw at any time.
In the course of this study, the use of qualitative research techniques such as
interviews, focus group discussions, media publications and scholarly articles enabled me to
extensively investigate and understand the historical, social and economic issues surrounding
the introduction and implementation of the LID, and its significance for reducing poverty and
creating fairness within the cocoa GVC. This is particularly important for early investigation
into an initiative that has only just begun, and required initial research to advance and
develop questions that can be further explored in the coming years as more data become
available for longitudinal study. An important qualitative research technique that was used in
gathering data for this study was interviews, which enabled me to properly plan ahead of
time, by preparing a structured interview guide. Again, the use of interviews enabled me to
understand the role of cocoa farmers in the cocoa GVC, which is primarily limited to the
cocoa production segment of the value chain, and as a result, they do not have substantial
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control when it comes to the issue of price. Aside from that, I observed the principles of




DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA
4.0 INTRODUCTION TO DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the findings from the series of interviews with participants, as well as
the triangulation of multiple sources and documents on the decision by Ghana to initiate a
guaranteed minimum price in the form of a LID for cocoa farmers and how this new policy
addresses the vicious cycle of poverty among farmers, leading to a sustainable cocoa sector.
Interviewees were asked about the viability of the LID, and whether it will help cocoa
farmers in Ghana fight the poverty that has plagued their farming business for years.
Altogether, the forty (40) interviewees were of the view that the $400 per metric tonne
amount is not only critical and justifiable for cocoa farmers on the basis of social justice, in
terms of increased farmgate prices, but also the amount could have been even higher, taking
into consideration several factors that goes into cocoa production. Interviewees were of the
view that the LID provides both fixed and enhanced income for cocoa farmers, which is a
modest beginning in a cocoa GVC that is driven by unfair and uneven market power and
concentration. The interviewees maintained that the LID will guarantee some stability in the
producer price of cocoa and sustainability of the cocoa industry in Ghana. Moreover, they
foresee this amount to be similar to a living wage because it will help smallholder cocoa
farmers break even and make enough savings, through which they can provide for their
households and workers.
4.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LID BY GHANA AND COTE D’IVOIRE
On 9th July 2019, Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire issued a statement detailing how the LID will
apply on the international market and in their respective domestic cocoa markets, which they
termed “Mechanism for the LID”. According to the statement, after extensive deliberation
with stakeholders at the Abidjan meeting, Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire have implemented a
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farmer floor price concept by instituting a fixed Living Income Differential (LID) of $400 per
metric tonne for every cocoa contract sold by either country for the 2020/2021 season. The
LID would apply to all categories of cocoa beans (Yves and Aidoo, 2019, p. 1).
4.1.1 Mechanism for the LID
1. All sales contracts will include a fixed LID of $400 per metric tonne (Yves and
Aidoo, 2019, p. 1). The $400 per metric tonne is an additional premium added to the
terminal market price.
2. The LID = $400 per metric tonne
3. The LID of $400 would be paid on all categories of cocoa beans contracts from
COCOBOD and the CCC, irrespective of the terminal market price (Yves and Aidoo,
2019, p. 1).
4. The LID will be exclusive of the generic Premiums of the respective countries (Yves
and Aidoo, 2019, p. 1). These Premiums are paid based on the quality and origin of
the cocoa beans.
5. A minimum of 70 percent of Gross FoB price of $2600, as the projected farmer floor
price, would be legislated and paid to farmers in both countries (Yves and Aidoo,
2019, p. 1). It is worth mentioning that, aside from the LID ($400), which would be
added to the terminal market price on the global market, the minimum of 70 percent
of Gross FoB price of $2600 is a further policy reform both governments are
introducing at the farmgate or domestic level for their cocoa farmers, which works up
to $1,820 per metric tonne.
6. It is the projection of both governments that the terminal market price in addition to
the $400 will push the Gross FoB price to $2,600. However, when the terminal market
price in addition to the $400 is under $2,600, both governments would have to cover
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the remaining balance in order to give their farmers a minimum of 70 percent of
Gross FoB price of $2,600 because this policy would be legislated.
7. It is important to reiterate that the minimum of 70 percent of Gross FoB price of
$2,600 stated in Point (5) would be passed into law by both governments, which
would operate at the farmgate level. Therefore, when this law is passed, Ghana and
Côte D’Ivoire would, from now on, be legally mandated to guarantee a minimum of
70 percent of Gross FoB price of $2,600 at the farmgate or domestic level. They want
to avoid a situation where different political administrations would come to power in
the future, and capriciously change this policy of a minimum of 70 percent of Gross
FoB price of $2,600.
8. When the Gross FoB price at the end of the Cocoa Season is between the minimum
price level of $2,600 and $2,900, the farmer would be entitled to “Bonus” payments
and other investments in the cocoa sector. The amount and the application of such
Bonus payments and other investments will be determined by each country (Yves and
Aidoo, 2019, p. 2).
9. When the Gross FoB for the season is above $2,900, the excess value will be placed
in a Stabilisation Fund to be set up under the Ghana-Côte D’Ivoire Cocoa Initiative
Secretariat (Yves and Aidoo, 2019, p. 2). The Ghana-Côte D’Ivoire Cocoa Initiative
Secretariat is a joint industry body, which is aimed at finding ways to improve the
income of farmers, combat cross border smuggling of cocoa beans and encourage
further collaboration between the two countries (Admin, 2020, para. 2). The purpose
of the Stabilisation Fund would be to help both governments get enough money to
pay the minimum of 70 percent of Gross FoB price of $2,600 when the terminal
market price in addition to the LID is under $2,600.
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10. When the Gross FoB for the season is above $2,900, this will be reported by the
external auditors of both countries to the Secretariat to determine the value of
payments to be made in the Stabilisation Fund (Yves and Aidoo, 2019, p. 2). Notably,
there are no further details on these external auditors and the timelines within which
they will report to the Secretariat.
Working Example:
{[ICE EU (Terminal) £ + Country Differential (Premiums) £] x GBP/USD} + LID ($400)
= Final Contract Price/Gross FoB (Yves and Aidoo, 2019, p. 2).
4.2 LIVING INCOME CALCULATION AND THE LID IN GHANA
The Living Income Community of Practice (LICoP) has been working over the years to
establish a living income for smallholder farmers, particularly in the cocoa sector. According
to the LICoP, which is an alliance of partners dedicated to supporting activities focused on
improving living incomes towards living income benchmarks, living income is the net annual
income needed for a household in a specific place to afford a decent standard of living for
occupants of that household. Central to this living income calculation is actually the “Living
Income Gap”, which is the disparity between what a farmer or his family earns from the
sources of income compared to what is defined as a living income (Uncommon Cacao, 2020,
para. 3 and 4).
For Fountain and Hütz-Adams, who wrote a position paper on the LID, the elements
of a decent standard of living include food, water, housing, education, healthcare, transport,
clothing and other essential needs including provision for unexpected events. They state that
because living income is defined as a net income, the costs of farming must be included in
any living income calculation. Being able to earn a living income is a basic human right, and
currently, they argue almost no cocoa farmer in West Africa is earning a living income.
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Without a living income for cocoa farmers, cocoa will never be sustainable. If a farmer must
choose between feeding his family and not cutting down his old growth trees, it is not a
choice. Moreover, other challenges facing the sector such as deforestation and child labour
will be difficult to tackle if farmers do not earn a living income because cocoa farmers are
extremely poor and would have to employ some of these illegal methods to enhance their
income.
Using the methodology of the LICoP, the living income Benchmark in Ghana as of
March 2020 was $312 per household per month for the cocoa growing regions, which
includes two adults and three children and comes to about $2.05 per person per day. From the
Chart above, the green dotted lines that run across the top should be equal to $312 per
household per month. The brown box at the bottom or the “Net Farm Income” refers to both
income from a cocoa farm and other cash crops, depending on the specific demography.
Thus, it is this brown box in the chart that the LID seeks to address. The LID is meant to
widen the brown box or the net farm income of cocoa farmers in Ghana, so that they can
reach the Living Income Benchmark of $312 per household per month (Uncommon Cacao,
2020, para. 5 and 6).
Based on this living income benchmark of $312 per household per month, Fair Trade
International increased their premium to $240 per metric tonnes from the older premium of
$200 per metric tonnes. They also increased their FoB export price to $2,400 per metric
tonne, instead of the previous $2,000 per metric tonnes. In both cases, the amount set by Fair
Trade International was paid to exporters and not directly to the cocoa farmers, even though it
was the need to support farmer living income calculations that inspired these changes by the
Fair Trade. In contrast and with the coming into effect of the LID, COCOBOD has taken this
amount further to $400 per metric tonnes added to all cocoa contracts sold on the
international market, which is will be paid to cocoa farmers, rather than exporters as it the
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case with the Fair Trade premium of $240 per metric tonnes. In addition, the LID uses
$2,600, as the global fixed floor price, compared to $2,400 used by Fair Trade International.
In effect, the purpose of the LID is to close the Living Income Gap of farmers as highlighted
by the LICoP (Uncommon Cacao, 2020, para. 7 and 8).
4.3 ADVANTAGES OF THE LID FOR COCOA FARMERS IN GHANA
The cocoa harvest season in Ghana officially opened on 3rd October 2020 and cocoa farmers,
who sold their cocoa beans to Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs), received a price that was
28 percent higher than last year’s farmgate price. This is because of the implementation of the
LID in Ghana. COCOBOD has allocated full payment of the LID and 70 percent of the FoB
price at the Bank of Ghana year on year exchange rate of 5.71cedis to $1 to increase farmgate
prices for smallholder cocoa farmers in Ghana (Uncommon Cacao, 2020, para. 2).
In announcing the producer price of cocoa for the 2020/21 crop season, the President
of Ghana, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo Addo, stated that the producer price of cocoa will
increase to 10,560 cedis per metric tonne, which is equivalent to 660 cedis per bag. The more
than 28.2 percent increase from the 8,240 cedis per metric tonne (515 per bag) producer price
of the just ended 2019/2020 crop season is the biggest in recent years. Prior to the
implementation of the LID, the prevailing cocoa producer price for the 2019/2020 crop
season was 8,240 (515 cedis per bag), which was just 8.2 percent increase over the 7,615
cedis per metric tonne (475 cedis per bag) in the 2018/2019 crop season.
The president attributed the price increase to the historic cooperation between Ghana
and Côte D’Ivoire leading to the implementation of the LID, which he argued will change
cocoa trading and bring $1.4 billion in extra income to the two countries for their 3 million
tons of cocoa that is produced annually. Speaking on 24th September 2020 at the launch of the
National Cocoa Rehabilitation Program at Sewfi Wiawso in the Western North region of
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Ghana, the President stated that “by this new producer price we have kept faith with our
commitment under the international arrangement with Côte D’Ivoire and global stakeholders
by awarding to our farmers the full $400 per metric tonne Living Income Differential (LID)”
(Hayford, 2020; Jacobs, 2020, para. 6). He stated that the two countries must continue to
cooperate to ensure that the policy is sustained and that Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire increase
their revenues, which flows from the multi-billion dollar international chocolate industry.
Even though Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire have always maintained strong bilateral
relations as neighbouring countries, there have been some challenges along the way. In 2014,
a maritime boundary dispute broke out between the two neighbouring countries following the
discovery of hydrocarbon resources off the western coast of Ghana. Both countries claim that
the hydrocarbon resources were in their jurisdiction. As a result, on 19th September 2014,
Ghana instituted arbitration proceedings at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS), requesting them to delimit the maritime boundaries between the two countries.
After more than two years of legal tussle, the Special Chamber of ITLOS delivered its
judgement in favour of Ghana. According to ITLOS, the hydrocarbon resources were within
Ghana’s jurisdiction, stating that the country is within its right to continue crude oil
exploration (Cannon, Maxwell and De Brugiere, 2017, para. 6). Although Côte D’Ivoire
strongly disagreed with the ruling, they had no options than to abide by the decision of the
tribunal. Therefore, following this maritime boundary dispute, the two countries have
committed to putting the past behind them and working towards building on the existing
special bond of kinship and cooperation for the mutual benefits of their people. At the
invitation of President Akufo Addo, President Alassane Ouattara of Côte D’Ivoire paid a
working and friendly visit to Ghana from the 16th-17th October 2017. He was accompanied by
a high-powered delegation including ministers of state, members of government and senior
state officials. As part of this renewed spirit of cooperation and brotherliness, Ghana and Côte
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D’Ivoire established a strategic cooperation framework called the Strategic Partnership
Agreement (SAP). The SAP covers several economic areas including cocoa and other
strategic crops (Ghana News Agency, 2017). Therefore, it is within the context of this
renewed partnership after this long-standing maritime boundary dispute that the two countries
have committed to working together by introducing and implementing the LID, starting with
cocoa, which is strategic and important to the economic fortunes of both countries.
Besides this renewed cooperation between the two West African neighbours, the issue
of cocoa and the welfare of farmers has always been a major source of fierce political debate
in Ghana. Previous and incumbent political administrations in Ghana have tried fervently to
endear themselves to the cocoa growing areas in order to enhance their political fortunes,
which are predominantly swing areas, not strongly affiliated to any political tradition. When
Ghana’s first President, Kwame Nkrumah, tried to do otherwise, it led to a bitter political
dispute between his Convention People’s Party (CPP) administration and the chiefs and
people of the Ashanti region, who produced most of the cocoa. As David Rooney (1988)
explains, the 1954 elections in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) was expected to usher in a period
of calm in the final progress towards independence, but rather this brought a period of such
bitterness, crisis, and division that the Gold Coast colony was in the danger of breaking up.
This crisis revolved around the key factor in so much of Ghana’s life, cocoa (Rooney, 1988,
p. 89). He states that, in their earliest political struggles, Kwame Nkrumah and the CPP had
cleverly used the issue of the Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease (CSSVD) in the cocoa
trees to strengthen their political demands for independence. The bitter resentment of cocoa
farmers against the colonial administration’s policy of “cutting out”, that is, cutting down
every tree affected by the swollen shoot disease was used by Kwame Nkrumah to swing the
cocoa growing areas of the Ashanti region and the middle belt of the Gold Coast behind him
in the elections in 1951 (Rooney, 1988, p. 89).
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As a result, Kwame Nkrumah, after winning the 1951 elections, inherited the Cocoa
Marketing Board (CMB) from the colonial administration. The CMB had been established to
protect the farmers from the violent price fluctuations for which the cocoa industry was
notorious. Each year, the CMB fixed the price to be paid to the farmers and marketed the
crop. However, from 1951 onwards the motive of the CPP government led by Kwame
Nkrumah was to give cocoa farmers as low a price as possible, and to use the balance of the
revenue from the sale of cocoa for development purposes. Although the use of cocoa
revenues for development purposes may not have been a bad policy by the Nkrumah
administration because of the radical infrastructural development it brought to different parts
of the country, the chiefs and people of the Ashanti region held the view that most of the
infrastructural developments like roads, schools and hospitals were mostly centred in the
capital city, Accra, whereas their region, which produced the bulk of the cocoa beans, did not
have an equitable share of development projects. In 1954 against the background of
increasing criticism, and with much greater power in the hands of Kwame Nkrumah and his
CPP government, the ominous issue of cocoa price had to be decided. Cocoa prices had risen
to £450 per tonne on the international market and expectations were that the producer’s price
would be substantially higher than the previous amount of 72 Shillings a load (Rooney, 1988,
p. 90).
In August 1954, the Finance Minister, Komla Gbedemah, in a budget statement read
to parliament, announced that for the next four years the price would be 72 Shillings, exactly
the same price as before. This decision, which the Finance Minister justified on the grounds
of the government needing revenue, caused an immediate uproar among the Ashantis, leading
directly to the formation of a dangerous and separatist political party in the Ashanti region
called the National Liberation Movement (NLM), which not only delayed the independence
of the Gold Coast for another two years because of their threats to secede from the Gold
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Coast, but also led to an increased number of political agitations and violent crimes in the
region (Rooney, 1988, p. 91).
Learning from history and the experiences of the Nkrumah administration, successive
political administrations have strenuously worked towards enhancing the social and economic
well-being of cocoa farmers, conscious of the fact that failure to do so would negatively
affect their political fortunes, and the current political administration in Ghana is no different
in this regard. Therefore, the implementation of the LID should also be viewed within this
context of the incumbent government wanting to endear itself to cocoa farmers and workers. I
maintain that the implementation of the LID in Ghana is an opportunity for President Akufo
Addo and his New Patriotic Party (NPP) administration to gain political and electoral capital
as accrues to those who, ultimately, care for the welfare needs of cocoa farmers and workers
in Ghana. This notwithstanding, President Akufo Addo and his Ivorian counterpart, President
Alassane Ouattara, should also be commended for collectively standing up against the power
of chocolate lead firms in the Global North, with some, obviously, dissatisfied with the LID
project, and are attempting to undermine and derail it. While it is often assumed that West
African cocoa producing governments cannot withstand the power and influence of chocolate
companies in Europe and North America, the LID demonstrates that, to some extent, they can
strongly push back against their dominance in the cocoa GVC and fight to secure the long
term livelihoods of their farmers and workers. Furthermore, the views of some giant
chocolate companies like those of Mondelēz International, who agree with Ghana and Côte
D’Ivoire that cocoa farmers should earn sufficient income to safeguard their sustainable
future livelihoods have also allowed both governments the space to make this historic
political decision of implementing the LID, which many leaders, over the years, have failed
to do.
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Again, apart from the national political context that has led to the implementation of
the LID in Ghana, the changing global political economy has also facilitated the enactment of
the LID. The global political economy of today is dramatically different from the one
inherited in 1945 when the foundations of the post-war global economic order were laid and
the governance architecture took roots. At present, the emerging economies of the developing
South are reshaping the world in a fundamental way. Over the past two decades, a
fundamental transformation has taken place in the global economy caused by the impressive
economic growth of developing countries like Brazil, Russia, India, and China, which
together and combined with the smaller economy of South Africa, form the BRICS group of
states (Fridell, 2014, p. 131). The economic centre of gravity is inextricably shifting towards
developing countries characterised by South-South cooperation and the significant scaling up
of South-South intervention by individual countries. For example, great efforts have been
made in the reduction of absolute poverty levels from $1.8 billion in 1990 to $1.4 billion in
2005, which was led mainly by the efforts of formerly underdeveloped states like China and
India (Puri, 2010, p. 7).
Moreover, presently, no fewer than 25 countries have robust South-South cooperation
agendas that encapsulates a wide spectrum of technical and economic engagement. In effect,
developing countries are gradually moving up the global value chain. This has been made
possible because of large-scale targeted development interventions by these states, and the
growing economic clout of emerging economies, which has translated into enhanced
participation and stronger economic voice in the global governance architecture (Puri, 2010,
p. 8). These changing economic patterns have been interlinked with new forms of
international coordination, regional integration, and socio-political linkages among Southern
partners. The results have been new relations between Southern countries; the emergence of
new instances of Southern competition and cooperation; and the rise of powerful Southern
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TNCs with global reach and influence. Altogether, these factors have had highly
differentiated repercussions across the South, posing new opportunities as well as challenges
for BRICS and smaller Southern countries (Fridell, 2014, p. 131).
Several Asian economies have been particularly central to the rise of the South,
experiencing rapid and sustained economic growth and accounting for the vast majority of
global poverty reduction since the 1980s (Fridell, 2014, p. 133). For instance, trade and
investments flow between Africa and Asia have been increasing steadily in the past decades
and these are largely because of flows from between China and India on one hand, and Africa
on the other (Tsikata, Fenny and Aryeetey, 2008, p. 3). For example, India’s total trade with
Africa grew from $6.8 billion in 2003 to $76.9 billion in 2018, and India is now Africa’s third
largest trade partner. Indian investments in Africa have also grown rapidly in the last decade
and the country is currently the seventh-largest investor in Africa (Chakrabarty, 2021, para.
2). Similarly, China-Africa bilateral trade has been rapidly increasing for the past 16 years.
The value of China-Africa trade in 2019 was $192 billion, up from $185 billion in 2018
(China-Africa Research Initiative, 2021, para. 1).
Therefore, the new geopolitics of South-South trade, investment and cooperation has
given Ghana more room to maneuver in terms of cocoa beans trade than in the past when it
had to only deal with giant TNCs in Northern states. Global South countries are far less
interested in Western chocolate companies than the United States or countries in Europe, and
thus, are less resistant to the implementation of the LID. For example, China is now moving
up the chain as one of the fastest growing cocoa beans export markets for Ghana. During the
2018-2019 crop season, Ghana’s export of cocoa beans to China was worth $47.7 million,
surpassing a major cocoa consuming country like Belgium, and becoming the second fastest
growing cocoa beans export market for Ghana (OEC, 2019). Again, Malaysia, a rising Global
South country, is now the third largest importer of cocoa from Ghana, overtaking important
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consuming countries like France and Japan (OEC, 2019). In effect, it is not only at the
ideological or political level that the rise of the South gives Ghana an opportunity to
introduce and enact the LID, but even in geopolitical terms, it gives Ghana more space to
push forward with the LID at the expense of Western interests. Ghana’s cocoa export markets
are increasingly shifting from Europe and North America to other regions of the world like
Asia and other parts of Africa. Global South countries such as China, India, Malaysia,
Singapore and South Africa are now Ghana’s major business and trading partners, and are
buying large tonnes of cocoa beans from the country, creating alternative cocoa export
markets for Ghana beyond those traditional ones in the Global North, and consequently,
offering them a great opportunity to regulate prices on the international market.
In an interview with Fiifi Boafo, who is the Public Affairs Manager of COCOBOD,
he argues that, with the implementation of the LID, cocoa should receive even more in terms
of income. However, in a market-based economy where it is a matter of demand and supply,
he holds the view that there is a need for Ghana to ensure that it is not seen to be overpricing
its product in a way that puts its cocoa in a disadvantaged position on the international
market. For him, COCOBOD strongly contends that looking at the indicators used in arriving
at the amount of $400 per metric tonne, they are of the considered opinion that this amount
will not make cocoa farmers in Ghana “rich”, but will be able to take them to above the
poverty line, and afford them some decent living, which remains the ultimate objective of
COCOBOD. The policy gives cocoa farmers the opportunity to save so that they can take
care of their family in addition to their farming business earning them the right income they
so deserve. As an illustration, he states that when you take an average farm of five to ten
acres of cocoa land, which is producing for example ten bags of cocoa a year, with the world
market price together with the LID multiplied by the ten bags, the expectation is that the
cocoa farmer should be able to move from the state of abject poverty to a decent living and
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income. Therefore, smallholder cocoa farmers will be able to save and provide for the
household.
On the issue of whether the LID is the solution to cocoa sustainability in Ghana, Fiifi
Boafo points out that the LID, obviously, is not the only solution that will work or make the
cocoa industry sustainable. Nonetheless, a guaranteed minimum price is critical and
non-negotiable, when you consider the several interventions within the cocoa value chain
aimed at the sustainability of the sector. For him, COCOBOD has argued that an important
issue that has not been strongly discussed, and which is pivotal to ensuring the sustainability
of the cocoa industry, is price. In the view of the COCOBOD, price is central, in the sense
that, you do not have to tell a cocoa farmer earning a good income to take his or her child, for
instance, to a good school. This cocoa farmer will inevitably provide a better life for himself
and his household when he or she earns enough from the cocoa business.
Drawing on Fiifi Boafo’s argument on the centrality of a guaranteed minimum price
to the sustainability of the cocoa sector in Ghana, I argue that there are numerous
consumer-country and multi-stakeholder initiatives in the cocoa sector that have failed to
consider the significance of guaranteed or higher prices. For instance, the WCF, established
in 2000, is a global membership organisation representing more than 100 member companies
across the cocoa GVC. It seeks to bring together public-private action to accelerate cocoa
sustainability through multi-stakeholder partnership, public and private investments, policy
dialogue and joint learning and knowledge sharing. In addition to other initiatives, the WCF
organises Cocoa Action, which was launched in 2014. The Cocoa Action platform is a
voluntary industry-wide strategy to bring together leading cocoa and chocolate companies,
producer governments and key stakeholders on priority issues in sustainability. Most of the
global cocoa and chocolate companies are participants in the Cocoa Action. Further, the
International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO) has organised a series of biennial World Cocoa
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Conferences to bring together stakeholder groups. The most recent one was held in Berlin in
April 2018 (Brack, 2019, pp. 18-19).
In December 2018, Belgium, the third largest importer of cocoa beans in Europe with
about 500 companies active in the cocoa processing industry, announced its “Beyond
Chocolate Commitment” to confront deforestation and child labour and ensure a living
income for cocoa producers. The goal of the commitment is for chocolate produced or traded
in Belgium to meet certification standards or to be produced with cocoa products from
company-specific sustainability programs by the end of 2025 at the latest. According to this
program, by 2030, deforestation, as a result of cocoa production for Belgian producers should
end and cocoa producers should earn at least a living income. Signatories to the commitment
included international and Belgian chocolate companies, retailers, trade unions, civil society,
social impact investors, universities and certification schemes (Brack, 2019, pp. 19-20).
In 2012, Germany, the second largest importer of cocoa beans in Europe jointly with
confectionery and retail companies and civil society launched the German Initiative on
Sustainable Cocoa (GISCO), with the goal of ensuring that at least 70 percent of the cocoa in
the end products sold in Germany should originate from certified or independently verified
cultivation by 2020. In January 2019, the German Federal Ministries for Economic
Cooperation and Development and for Food and Agriculture launched a Ten-Point Action
Plan for a sustainable cocoa sector. This included the long-term plan of sourcing 100 percent
certified cocoa and the objective of establishing compelling regulations, which establishes a
single standard for sustainability produced cocoa. The German government has also
committed to establishing a Living Income Task Force during 2019 to act on the issues of
incomes in the cocoa sector (Brack, 2019, p. 20).
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In November 2018, the French government published a strategy to tackle imported
deforestation including proposals to stop importing products linked to deforestation and
unsustainable agriculture by 2030, to help companies meet their own deforestation objectives,
and to encourage financial institutions to take ecological and social issues into account in
investment decisions. The French government has also proposed establishing the due
diligence requirement on companies at European levels based on the French “devoir de
vigilance” law of 2017, which mandates companies to identify and reduce the social and
environmental risk related to their operations and supply chains. The Strategy comprised the
use of development aid, public procurement policy and minimum criteria for biofuel
feedstocks, and the creation of a national platform for tackling deforestation, bringing
together businesses, NGOs, and public authorities to support implementation and monitoring
of zero-deforestation commitments made by private-sector stakeholders in particular by
facilitating their work on traceability and risk analysis in the supply chains (Brack, 2019, p.
20).
In 2011, Nestlé launched the Nestlé Cocoa Plan, a global cocoa sustainability
initiative that is committed to investing $120 million over the next ten years (2011-2021).
The plan aims to tackle challenges facing cocoa farming communities such as age and
condition of cocoa trees, decreasing yields and insufficient income. The plan also aims to
train and educate local farmers and help them increase their income by improving the quality
and productivity of their harvest. The plan focuses on five pillars: farmer education,
sustainability, supply chain efficiency, improving social conditions and working with
partners. For example, with farmer education, the plan supports Field Schools, which assist
farmers understand how to increase their yields and quality of their cocoa. According to the
company, they are committed to buying cocoa from trained farmers and paying a premium
for higher quality cocoa (Nestlé, 2019).
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I acknowledge that these major initiatives such as certification schemes, social and
environmental standards and state regulations are equally useful and contribute to the
sustainability of the cocoa sector. For instance, there is the need for state regulations and
proper governance structures that will prevent cocoa farmers from indiscriminately cutting
down trees and moving into protected forest zones. Again, there is also the need for standards
that ensure that cocoa farmers do not exploit their labourers, both children and adults, and
that the excess income gained from the LID will be used to pay higher wages to labourers and
hire the services of adults, instead of the use of children in certain cocoa activities. This
notwithstanding, I maintain that they have, at the same time, avoided the critical issue of
guaranteed or higher prices for cocoa farmers. I do not disagree with the fact that child labour
and deforestation should be seriously confronted within the cocoa sector, especially in major
producing countries like Ghana and Côte D’ Ivoire. Neither do I disagree with the fact that
cocoa farmers deserve a living income. In principle, the majority of major players in the
cocoa sector also do not disagree with this desired goal. The critical question, however, which
these major initiatives have constantly failed to discuss, is how to bring about the objective of
a living income, which is so widely talked about in the cocoa sector. Current problems in the
cocoa sector, including low farmgate prices, child labour and deforestation will be
significantly addressed, when cocoa farmers achieve a living income guaranteed by price
regulation, for which the LID offers, in contrast to these existing multi-stakeholder and
consumer-country pledges and initiatives, which are woefully inadequate and have failed to
make substantial and long term impacts on the livelihoods of farmers in major cocoa
producing countries like Ghana.
I strongly believe that, through this collective action by Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire, the
LID will attain higher and more stable prices for cocoa farmers and workers. Certification
schemes such as Fairtrade International, on the other hand, seek to offer higher and more
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stable prices for cocoa farmers. Moreover, while the prices set by Fairtrade International are
above conventional ones, cocoa farmers in Ghana are still earning income far below the
international poverty line. For instance, the global fixed floor price of $2,400 used by
Fairtrade International is lower than what is considered by the LID, which is $2,600. My
argument is that a socially reformist, state-led development strategy like the LID will enable
Ghana to develop as one the most efficient cocoa economies in the world and allow cocoa
farmers to enjoy high living standards. As stated by Fridell (2014), the experience of a
Central American country like Costa Rica in leading a state-led development strategy in
coffee, despite its relatively small size, historical dependence on a limited range of exports,
and lack of geopolitical and economic power compared to larger Southern states, offers two
very important general lessons for similar commodity-producing countries such as Ghana.
Firstly, a central role of the state in managing agricultural commodities including cocoa in
addition to democratic social reforms can provide developmental gains to the overall
population, most especially farmers and workers, and secondly, under the right conditions, he
explains that, the state can be made to play the role of leading development (Fridell, 2014, pp.
42-43). Therefore, I argue that major cocoa producing countries including Ghana can do a
great deal more to protect and defend the interests of poor farmers and workers through social
reforms and state-led development strategies, than they most often tend to do (Fridell, 2014,
p. 43).
Again, Fiifi Boafo makes the point that there will be no need for Inter-Governmental
Organisations (IGOs) including the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to push laws to
prevent children from engaging in Child Labour (CL) within the cocoa sector in Ghana, when
cocoa farmers are given higher incomes. They would naturally give their children the best of
education and care. Similarly, the very things players in the industry complain about such as
the use of children, and that the cocoa farmers are supposed to employ workers, and not to
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rely on their children for farm support, at the heart of all these discussions, is the issue of
cocoa farmers receiving fair income. Accordingly, they will be prepared to do what is
required for the industry to grow. Of course, he asserts that we must do everything to ensure
that laws on child labour work, but to ensure the sustainability of the industry significant
interventions in terms of stability in prices will ensure that cocoa farmers resolve these
challenges themselves.
Fiifi Boafo contends that one thing the COCOBOD has observed is that failure to
implement this policy of a guaranteed minimum price was going to affect the sustainability of
the cocoa industry. This is because cocoa farmers in Ghana have started turning their farms
over to other competing cash crops, in the conviction that they are not earning enough from
cocoa. Subsequently, cocoa farmers are abandoning their farms for rubber plantations while
others are selling their cocoa farmlands to gold prospectors. Rubber cultivation is gaining
local reputation among cocoa farmers in Ghana because rubber prices are more stable as
opposed to cocoa, which makes it easier for farmers to make a decent living compared to
cocoa production. Nonetheless, rubber cultivation is unlikely to provide a sustainable
alternative in the long term looking at how much Ghana depends on cocoa for revenue,
income and rural employment. Therefore, the major reason for the LID is to ensure that
farmers continue with the business of cocoa production, which remains the mainstay of the
Ghanaian economy and the chocolate industry.
For his part, Toma Imihere, a Financial Analyst, Economist and Journalist with the
Goldstreet Business Ghana, the LID is “very crucial”. For him, this policy by the government
of Ghana can be described “as a fixed sum”, which is supposed to go directly to cocoa
farmers no matter how prices change on the international market. Every year the government
of Ghana fixes the price of cocoa, which can go up or even come down, but in the case of the
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LID, the $400 per metric tonne remains unchangeable and will be paid directly to cocoa
farmers.
Apart from the LID serving as a guaranteed minimum price for cocoa farmers, he
points out that the LID has implications for the management of the cocoa sector in Ghana.
This is because this policy will attract young people into the sector. He observes that for some
time now young people in Ghana, due to insufficient prices, are pulling out of the sector. The
youth do not want to enter into cocoa farming, but rather, they prefer to go into illegal gold
mining activities, popularly known in Ghana as “galamsey”, which is causing destruction to
the country’s vegetative cover and pollution of water bodies. He makes the point that there is
an aging cocoa farmer population, which must be replaced and through this policy of LID,
which brings in an extra income, there will be a lot of the young men and women who will be
attracted into the sector.
Secondly, he asserts that this policy eases the managerial problems of the
COCOBOD, in particular the problem of structural debt, which arises from the subsidies they
provide for cocoa farmers. He asserts that we hear every year about how the Ghana Cocoa
Board borrows cocoa receivable back loans from several international lenders, known as the
Cocoa Syndicated Loans, which is self-amortizing. The fact is that part of the loan is used to
provide subsidies to cocoa farmers in Ghana, which in his view is unsustainable. Therefore,
with the coming in of the LID, COCOBOD can decide to reduce its subsidies, and will have a
more sustainable business model, which is crucial for the cocoa sector. It is hoped that there
will come a time when farmers will be earning enough from the LID, such that they can
provide certain services including agricultural inputs for themselves. Moreover, COCOBOD
can even hand over the supply of inputs to the private sector because farmers are earning
enough, and as such, have the financial muscle to buy some of those inputs. Even when the
inputs are provided on commercial terms, cocoa farmers in Ghana could be able to afford
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them because of their enhanced economic position. He explains that the LID is not only
crucial to the sustainability of cocoa production in Ghana, but is essential to the regulator
itself, which is COCOBOD. The LID could provide them with a sustainable financial model
through which they could structure their debt. For him, there is no doubt that the LID is
“absolutely crucial”.
Toma Imihere argues that looking at the Ghanaian economy in general, workers do
not earn enough to take care of their living expenses, and cocoa farmers are not different from
other workers within the Ghanaian economy. Thus, the issue of whether this allows farmers
to achieve a living income should be analysed within the context of the entire Ghanaian
economic milieu. He corroborates the Public Affairs Manager of COCOBOD by asserting
that the $400 per metric tonne will not make farmers wealthy. However, this guaranteed
minimum price will support farmers and allow them to break even, as well as have some
money in some years to save, so as to provide for their family and their cocoa business. He
explains that the fact that COCOBOD is running at a long-term structural and financial deficit
implies that COCOBOD is already spending more on these farmers than it earns, in terms of
its entire export proceeds. Hence, the LID is “a good deal for the farmers”. The onus, he
states, is on COCOBOD and by extension the Government of Ghana to ensure that this
money goes directly to the farmers.
He maintains that the LID is a major step forward for achieving cocoa sustainability
in Ghana. This decision is part of a wider effort to make the cocoa industry sustainable based
on commercial pricing for inputs, and he argues that is essential for the industry to grow. He
holds that COCOBOD through this policy is trying to get more money into the hands of the
farmers in addition to making them productive. When cocoa farmers are productive,
inevitably they earn more in terms of income. In effect, he holds the view that, with LID
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coming into effect, “the government wants to put more money in the hands of cocoa farmers
and still take the margin off the top”.
For their part, Joseph Opoku Gakpo, a Cornell University Fellow and winner of the
International Award for Agricultural Journalism, Stephenson Anane Boateng, the President of
the Ghana National Cocoa Farmers Association (GNACOFA) and Jonathan Ofori, an
Agricultural Journalist hold the view that the LID will help cocoa farmers stabilize the
income of cocoa farmers, which is highly variable due to the political economy of the cocoa
GVC. They state that farmers are unable to plan their business because of the lack of a
guaranteed pricing structure. Nonetheless, they argue that, although the LID will allow
farmers to break even and make some savings along the way, there are other sectors that the
Government of Ghana must invest into beyond the LID. In addition to the LID, the
government must invest more in cocoa processing and value addition, which remains a
dismal failure in Ghana. Local cocoa growing communities in Ghana must be empowered to
process most of the cocoa beans on their own, and that, it is only when value is added to the
cocoa beans that is produced locally, and not only exported in its primary form, will farmers
achieve a true living income in the short term.
Although Ghana accounts for 20 percent of the $9 billion global cocoa beans market,
less than 25 percent of the country’s cocoa beans grown are locally processed. This means
that Ghana captures only 5 percent of the $28 billion global cocoa processing industry
(Sulaiman and Boachie-Danquah, 2017, p. 11). This unimpressive performance of Ghana in
the processing industry can be attributed to the lack of investments, particularly in the energy
sector. The high costs of energy due to fluctuating prices of fuel, which has a negative effect
on the cost of production. Machinery can also become disrupted or malfunction, and thus,
create huge costs in terms of missed production and considerable cost to fix broken down
machinery. Unreliable electricity supply in Ghana can also disrupt cocoa processing activities
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(Sulaiman and Boachie-Danquah, 2017, p. 31). Therefore, for Ghana to immensely increase
its cocoa processing capacity, it must be ready to invest in the provision of constant and
reliable energy supply, which is critical to the cocoa processing segment of the cocoa GVC.
For Sampson Ahi, the Member of Parliament for Bodi and Member of the Food,
Agriculture and Cocoa Affairs Committee of Ghana’s Parliament, argues that, in addition to
the LID, cocoa farmers in Ghana should be paid the Gross FoB price of cocoa, instead of the
Net FoB price they receive. Cocoa farmers, he argues, should be given “the full value of what
they are producing”. According to Sampson Ahi, the Gross FoB price is the international
market price of cocoa devoid of any deduction. Thus, it is by paying cocoa farmers the Gross
FoB price that they can achieve a real income. For him, analysing the way the Producer’s
Price of Cocoa is calculated from the start puts cocoa farmers at a great disadvantage. He
states that the government deducts a lot from the world market price before at least seventy
percent is paid to them. A cocoa farmer in Brazil, for example, who is paid fifty percent of
the Gross FoB price is economically better off, according to him, then a farmer in Ghana who
is paid seventy to seventy-five percent of the Net FoB price after more than nine items have
been deducted. The list of items that are taken away before the Net FoB price is paid to
farmers in Ghana include funds for jute sacks, funds for cocoa roads, cocoa scholarship
schemes, free fertilizer, mass spraying, expenditure for the COCOBOD Head Office, buyers
margin by the Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs), and quality control. Consequently, he
believes that it is only when farmers are paid the Gross FoB price, along with the LID, will
they achieve a living income.
On the other hand, according to Toma Imihere, the problem with government paying
farmers the Gross FoB price as proposed by the Member of Parliament for Bodi, Sampson
Ahi is that COCOBOD in so doing would then have to take away all the subsidies it provides
to these farmers. For him, the subsidies COCOBOD provides is more than the twenty-five to
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thirty percent it takes from the Gross FoB value when calculating the Producer’s Price. The
government will have to use part of the revenue made from the sale of cocoa to provide
incentives to cocoa farmers. Again, what is the guarantee that farmers when given the full
value of the international market price will provide these farming inputs themselves? He
states that cocoa farmers in the hinterlands are used to government providing incentives, the
problem is that when they are paid the Gross FoB price, they are likely not to buy the
required inputs needed for production. Government must ensure that the extra money given to
the farmers, part of it is being used to buy the proper production inputs. When the Gross FoB
price is paid to farmers, will they be ready to use part of the money to buy the required
farming inputs for their cocoa production? In this case, production may be affected by close
to thirty to forty percent. Subsidies provided for cocoa farmers in Ghana include free
fertilizer, free seedlings, pesticides and other farming inputs.
Presently, price-setting is based on a calculated percentage of the Net FoB price that
Ghana receives from the export of cocoa beans. To arrive at the Net FoB price, the PPRC first
deducts an amount from the Gross FoB price for disease and pest control, fertilizer
application, operational input costs, the cocoa scholarship scheme, and education support and
cocoa rehabilitation (such as nurseries and improved seedling), which has been useful to
farmers in increasing production. The remaining percentage goes to the Government of
Ghana through COCOBOD and other industry players within the cocoa value chain in Ghana
as revenue. For example, COCOBOD retains about 9 percent of the cocoa Net FoB price
(Mulangu, Miranda and Maïga, 2017, p. 482). For the 2017-2018 season, the producer price
was set at 75 percent of the Net FoB price and the remaining 25 percent of the Net FoB
amount was used for cost items such as buyers’ margin, hauliers, cost storage and shipping,
disinfection, grading, and COCOBOD revenue.
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I agree with Toma Imihere that the proposal that cocoa farmers should be given the
full value of the Gross FoB is unrealistic and unconvincing, because there is enough evidence
to show that COCOBOD through these deductions have supported cocoa farmers to enhance
their productivity. For example, in 2015, COCOBOD, through its Seed Production Division,
distributed about 50 million hybrid seedlings to farmers across the country to increase their
yields and incomes. This initiative forms part of COCOBOD’s effort to raise the country’s
cocoa output from the current 850,000 tonnes to 1.5 million tonnes (Akalaare, 2015, para. 1
and 2). Again, since 2001, COCOBOD has engaged in mass spraying exercise of cocoa farms
across the country. This exercise is to help cocoa farmers effectively manage cocoa pests and
diseases, as well as improve the soil fertility and quality of cocoa. All these initiatives by
COCOBOD contributed to Ghana, for the first time, attaining over one million metric tonnes
of cocoa in the 2010/2011 crop season. Nonetheless, I should also point out that, as with most
government agencies in developing countries, most of COCOBOD’s initiatives are riddled
with inefficiencies including corruption and partisanship. In most cases, these deductions
have proven counter-productive because some of the service provision, for which these
deductions are made, such as the procurement and distribution of fertilizer and seedlings, are
ineffective, and there are constant complaints from cocoa farmers that agro-chemicals do not
reach them on time or they are simply not available. According to Michael Amu, who is a
farmer in Sefwi Akontombra in the Western North Region,“three or sometimes four cocoa
farmers are given one bottle of agrochemicals to share”. In most cases, those in charge of the
distribution of these agricultural inputs are susceptible to nepotism, corruption and smuggling
to neighbouring countries such as Côte D’Ivoire (Bymolt, Laven and Tyszler, 2018, p. 211).
Therefore, for most farmers in Ghana, the problem in the cocoa sector is less about the 25-30
percent deductions that goes to government and its agencies than about how these initiatives
can be implemented in an efficient and effective manner devoid of corruption, nepotism,
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partisanship, and thus, allow them to increase their yields and make enough income and
savings.
4.4 CHALLENGES OF THE LID IN GHANA
For Fountain and Hütz-Adams, who wrote a position paper on behalf of the VOICE-Network,
they argue that the announcement by the Ghanaian Government to introduce a guaranteed
minimum price to cocoa buyers is an important and necessary step in order to make the cocoa
sector more sustainable and should be supported by the cocoa industry. This initiative, they
maintain, will improve the income situation for cocoa farmers. For them, the LID is an
extremely welcoming building block to make the cocoa sector truly sustainable in terms of
respecting the human rights of cocoa farmers in Ghana. Nonetheless, they express concerns,
which the Ghanaian Government and COCOBOD must address for the proposed LID to be
effective.
They argue that intervening on price without looking at supply measures and enabling
policies may not have the desired positive impact. This requires careful policy management,
which COCOBOD must undertake. Additionally, they assert that these efforts by the
Government of Ghana to increase prices is a necessary first step, but it is simply not enough
for cocoa farmers to achieve a living income. They point out that the $1,820 per metric tonne
of cocoa at the farmgate is much lower than the prices farmers need in order to make a living
income. They maintain that the LID of $400 per metric tonne should be even higher.
Fountain and Hütz-Adams (2019) contend that these living income price calculations
set by COCOBOD have erred significantly on the low side. They assert that, for a long time,
being able to determine a fair farmgate price for cocoa was very hard, as there are so many
variables that influence the answer. Some variables were not answerable until recently due to
a lack of any data at all, let alone qualitative data. However, in the past two years, substantial
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data has become more available publicly. Therefore, they point out that any living income
calculations by Ghana should be based on the following data, which they used to support
their assertion that the $400 per metric tonne should be much higher (p. 1).
First, they contend that living income calculations should take into consideration the
issue of production costs. One variable that is often not taken into consideration is the cost of
production, especially as very little data is currently available about the cost of hired labour,
input, fertilizer, and other production cost for cocoa farmers. They point out that their
estimates are based on available data both publicly and privately. However, they hold the
view that these numbers must be further solidified through the publication, by companies, of
their data (Fountain and Hütz-Adams, 2019, p. 1). Their calculations are presented below.
Available data Ghana
Total farm yield 1,232
Publicly available farm size in (ha) declared
by farmers
3.33
Production costs per hectare $358
Total production cost $ 1,192.14
Living Income level per household per year
(Smith and Sarpong, 2018)
$ 3,948
Percentage of household from income from
cocoa
67%
Gross income from cocoa needed to achieve
living income
$ 3,837
Necessary farm gate price per kilo $ 3,116
Figure 2: Desired farmgate price levels for farmers to achieve a living income (Fountain and
Hütz-Adams, 2019, p. 3).
Secondly, they argue that there is a need for realistic productivity increases. They
make the point that all current calculations for a desired farm gate price assume farmers will
be able to significantly increase productivity. They point out that only when cocoa farmers
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realistically increase their productivity will a family be able to earn a living income. There
are several key problems to that approach. To start with, earning a living income is a
fundamental human right for everyone, and should not be available only to the highest
achiever. Average cocoa farming households should be able to achieve a living income, not
just the outliers. They explain that it is highly questionable whether cocoa farms will be able
to achieve the kind of productivity increase by the $400 per metric tonne set by COCOBOD
((Fountain and Hütz-Adams, 2019, p. 1-2).
Thirdly, they point out that there is the need for available and affordable inputs for
cocoa farmers. For Fountain and Hütz-Adams, most cocoa farms are old, and therefore, to
achieve a productivity increase, agricultural inputs such as fertilisers, seedlings and pesticides
need to be available and affordable. This is not the case in most of the West African cocoa
growing regions. In Ghana, cocoa farmers today pay fifty percent of the cost of fertilizer
when, in the past, it was given to them for free. In any case, even if these materials were
available farmers would have to invest money and labour to obtain and supply these inputs.
This requires access to affordable credit, which is simply not available to most farmers as we
speak (Fountain and Hütz-Adams, 2019, p. 2).
Moreover, they contend that there is the issue of availability and affordability of
labour, which is crucial in cocoa production. This is because cocoa production is highly
labour intensive especially during the growing phase. In the view of Fountain and
Hütz-Adams, increased productivity per hectare requires an increase in labour hours.
Unfortunately, there are presently no publicly available and reliable data on the relations
between labour days and productivity per hectare. However, Fountain and Hütz-Adams state
that published data of companies and research institutions available to them show that an
increase to about 800 kilograms per hectare would require an increased amount of labour of
at least 50 percent. This means that increasing productivity also requires a decent price for
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cocoa, and it is highly questionable whether at the current price levels, including the LID,
would pay off for farmers to invest in all this extra labour. As they report a Ghanaian cocoa
farmer say “price is the best fertiliser”, if you want to increase yield per hectare (Fountain
and Hütz-Adams, 2019, p. 2).
Further, Fountain and Hütz-Adams argue that there is the need for Good Agricultural
Practices (GAPs), which will help cocoa farmers produce cocoa in a safe environment. They
point out that GAPs are important because they can improve productivity and some measures
even at very low cost. Nevertheless, even with improved agricultural practices, it is going to
be a challenge for farmers to reach 800kgs per hectare as the experience of many projects in
the past decades has shown. Their position is that, if cocoa farmers double their yields, the
sector would be faced with a serious overproduction challenge (Fountain and Hütz-Adams,
2019, p. 2).
Fountain and Hütz-Adams ask the question whether farm sizes are overstated. For
them, technological advances such as GPS and Polygon mapping show that farmers’ actual
cocoa plots are often smaller than originally declared by farmers themselves, especially in
Ghana. This significantly impacts several variables of the living income reference price
calculation. It means that productivity is already often higher than is assumed, as declared
total yield per farm is often correct. This will also have implications for many sustainability
projects, if productivity levels are already significantly higher, it is not reasonable to expect
as much return on investment on productivity-enhancing activities. According to Fountain
and Hütz-Adams, based on an average of five separate databases that are not publicly
available, but known to them, they contend that the average actual farm is reflected in the
table provided below. This means that current productivity in Ghana is probably significantly
higher than currently assumed. Additionally, it might be possible that a farmer has more
plantations (for example illegal plots in protected areas) than these included in the
78
measurement. They maintain that, despite these problems, they have published these figures
to put pressure on all involved stakeholders who have reliable data to make them publicly
available ((Fountain and Hütz-Adams, 2019, p. 2).
Ghana (averages) Self-Declared Measured by GPS
Farm size (in ha) 3.33 1.74
Farm yield (in MT) 1,232 1,232
Productivity 370 708
Figure 3: Farm sizes and yields in Ghana (Fountain and Hütz-Adams, 2019, p. 2)
For Fountain and Hütz-Adams, even with the assumption that current declared farm
sizes and yields are correct, farm gate prices should be higher than the current reference
price. They conclude that, based on data available to them and the numerous factors
recounted, the minimum farmgate price necessary to earn a living income from cocoa, in their
estimation, should be at least $3,116 per metric tonne for Ghana, and not $1,820 per metric
tonne, guaranteed by the new legislation. In other words, for them, the LID ($400) makes no
substantial difference because the projection by Ghana that the $400 together with the
terminal market price will push the Gross FoB to $2,600, and thus, guarantee a minimum of
70 percent for cocoa farmers at the farm gate level is highly flawed and errs significantly on
the low side. According to them, frontrunners in the cocoa industry must take the issue of
price and a living income seriously, which is key to the survival of the industry.
Disappointingly, most cocoa supply chain actors have no living income reference price at all,
this includes the Rainforest Alliance, despite repeated requests to put such a policy in place,
as well as the large chocolate and cocoa lead firms. They should all do so at the shortest
possible time as cocoa cannot be considered sustainable if the price for farmers is insufficient
to cover a living income
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Further, they explain that, although the extra moneys gained through the $400 per
metric tonne will assist farmers to increase their income and improve on household welfare,
there must be transparency about what part of this windfall will go to the producer
governments, and all parties, especially producer governments must equally ensure these
prices benefit cocoa-farming households directly. Again, Fountain and Hütz-Adams state that
COCOBOD should be financially transparent. For them, if stabilisation funds are to be set up,
the governance of these funds will require significantly improved transparency and
accountability compared with their predecessors. Moreover, the LID is doomed to fail if
government bodies do not provide a high level of transparency. They point out that producer
governments must disclose how much revenue they receive from cocoa, and for COCOBOD
to ensure transparency and good governance (VOICE Network, 2019, p. 1). According to
Imoro Seidu, who is a cocoa farmer in Tarkwa Breman in the Western region, “COCOBOD
do not account to cocoa farmers in Ghana; they are only interested in the cocoa production
and not the welfare of farmers”.
Aside from that, they make the point that higher prices will lead to oversupply if that
cannot be accompanied by policies that aim at diversification of crops, agroforestry,
reforestation, protection of forest, investment in infrastructure and other supportive measures
that limit cocoa production. At the same time, farmers should be able to improve their
existing trees. Not allowing farmers to rejuvenate and invest in their plantations is equivalent
to making it impossible for them to improve their farming business and achieve a living
income (VOICE Network, 2019, p. 2). They called on chocolate and companies in the cocoa
GVC to support the initiative by the Ghanaian government as well as other points they have
outlined. More importantly, they ask all industry players to commit to ensuring all cocoa
farmers earn a living income worldwide. These efforts must not be limited to supporting the
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initiative of a guaranteed minimum price, but must aim at ensuring many other interventions.
Significantly, higher prices must be part of a holistic solution.
4.5 CHOCOLATE LEAD FIRMS AND THEIR RESPONSE TO THE LID
The introduction and implementation of the LID has received mixed reactions from cocoa
and chocolate companies around the world. While some companies including Blommer
Chocolate, Mondelēz, Barry Callebaut, Nestlé and Cémoi have publicly supported the
initiative, stating that it represents a clear action to drive change at the farmgate level, others
including the Hershey company, Mars Incorporated and Olam International have raised
concerns over its implementation, claiming that it will lead to the surplus production of cocoa
beans, and may eventually prompt them to seek other supply sources.
According to a statement issued by Blommer Chocolate Company, which is the
largest cocoa processor and ingredient chocolate supplier in North America, they support the
overall goal of the governments of Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire to increase farmer remuneration.
They stated that developing new and innovative methods to achieve this should remain a
priority while maintaining a continued focus on critical work being done under the industry’s
sustainability activities. They explained that they look forward to their continued partnership
and collaboration with Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire to ensure a sustainable and thriving cocoa
sector, where farmers can prosper, cocoa growing communities are empowered, human rights
are respected, and the environment is protected. In addition, they stated that, through their
Sustainable Origin platform, they are working closely with producing governments, farmer
organisations and other development partners on many initiatives to catalyse the
transformation of traditional farms into diversified, sustainable and profitable businesses.
They argue that these efforts are also necessary to boost farmer income even though they may
not be enough without increased remuneration to farmers for their crops (Mighty Earth, 2019,
para. 7).
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For their part, Mondelēz International, which is an American multinational snacks and
confectionery company, stated that cocoa farmers should earn sufficient income to provide a
decent standard of living today, as well as to safeguard the sustainable future livelihoods for
the cocoa farmers in Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire. According to them, they welcome both
countries’ efforts to address cocoa farmer income through the LID as an important building
block to achieve a sustainable livelihood from cocoa. For them, this is a unique opportunity
to create the necessary partnerships to ensure the long-term beneficial effect of the new
pricing approach and look forward to collaborating with both governments to ensure no
further deforestation will take place and human rights are protected. They concluded by
stating that a sector-wide strategy with coordinated actions by all stakeholders of the cocoa
value chain is needed to propel the transformation of cocoa farming into modern, sustainable,
and profitable businesses that provide sustainable livelihoods for cocoa growing families and
workers (Mighty Earth, 2019, para. 18).
Barry Callebaut, which is one of the largest cocoa processors and chocolate
manufacturers in the world, stated that they welcome the initiative of the two governments to
support cocoa farmer income, and they are already working with Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire
and other chocolate companies to have a smooth implementation of the LID. They explain
that they remain committed to continue to lead on sustainability as defined by their Forest
Chocolate objectives and this will not change. On the other hand, they stated that, even
though the LID presents opportunities for cocoa farmers, there are associated risks such as
further deforestation. For them, “in the living income differential discussions there has been
little space to embrace much needed discussions on some potential risks highlighted on
sustainability” (Mighty Earth, 2019, para. 6).
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Nonetheless, despite the commitments and general support of some chocolate
companies to pay the LID, others have, in various ways, attempted to avoid paying the LID,
and in essence, favouring profit over higher incomes for cocoa farmers. Therefore, it did not
come as a surprise to many observers of the cocoa industry when “a global chocolate war”
broke out between Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire and two American chocolate companies over the
payment of the LID, with both countries accusing Hershey of squeezing the cocoa Futures
market in an effort to avoid paying the LID of $400 and Mars Incorporated of changing its
cocoa butter procurement processes in order to avoid the LID (Almeida, Mieu and De
Bassompierre, 2020). In response to this accusation, Hershey accused the two producing
countries of putting out a misleading statement. According to them, “it is unfortunate that
Côte D’Ivoire and Ghana have elected to distribute a misleading statement… and jeopardise
such critical programmes that directly benefit cocoa farmers” (Oils and Fats International,
2020, para. 8).
Prior to this accusation by Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire, Hershey had released a
statement in which they stated that the implementation of the LID is a complicated
arrangement, and thus, together with the entire industry, will be working with the two
governments to further understand the LID. According to them, any plans to increase the
income of cocoa farmers would need to be implemented carefully to ensure that they do not
create imbalances in the long-term supply of cocoa that could result in surpluses and
destabilise the cocoa market, which for them will ultimately hurt the farmer. Moreover, these
plans need to guard against new production on protected forestlands. They explained that
they want to work together with both governments to see an increased share of the global
cocoa price transferred to farmers through the LID and they look forward to joining the rest
of the cocoa industry to continue these discussions with both governments and other partners
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to improve livelihoods of farmers and the sustainability of cocoa farming long in the future
(Mighty Earth, 2019, para. 15).
Not long after issuing this statement raising concerns about what, in their view, will
be the potential fallouts of the LID, in November 2020, Hershey took an unusual step of
directly sourcing over 30,000 tonnes of cocoa beans from the futures market. This move by
Hershey drastically affected the cocoa market on ICE Futures market in the United States
(New York), with the December 2020 futures climbing to more than 30 percent over that of
March 2020. The decision by Hershey to purchase cocoa beans through the exchange allowed
them to obtain cheaper supplies, and thus, saved them millions of dollars. This is because
cocoa beans sourced from exchange stockpiles do not have the LID applied to them (Peña,
2020). When contacted about this decision, Hershey explained that it does not discuss details
of its buying and hedging activities, and that it purchases cocoa from a variety of suppliers
and sources to meet its raw material needs. Nonetheless, they added that it is important for
the two countries to remember that there is still cocoa in the marketplace that was produced
and sold before the implementation of the LID (Peña, 2020, para. 11). According to Derek
Chambers, a former head of cocoa at Sucden and who retired in 2018 after trading cocoa for
fifty years, this move by Hershey was smart and a perfectly legal use of the futures market.
He argues that this decision by Hershey works for them on many levels because it gives them
competitive advantage against other US Chocolate makers. For him, “it (Hershey) should
ensure that they can buy the cocoa they need at cheap differentials in the months to come,
through the futures or commercially” (Almeida, 2020, para. 6).
This move by Hershey infuriated Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire, leading to the cancelation
of all sustainability programs, which Hershey was directly and indirectly involved in. Further,
both countries stated that transnational companies running programs on behalf of Hershey
would be barred from operating them. In a joint statement signed on 30th November 2020 by
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the Chief Executive Officers of COCOBOD and the CCC titled “Abuse of the derivatives
market to impoverish the West African farmer”, they accused Hershey of “conspiracy and
machinations” stating that the use of the cocoa futures market was a clear indication of
Hershey’s intention to avoid paying the LID. They explained that they “have observed with
great concern the actions taken by your company on the New York terminal to take delivery
of physical cocoa” and that “the manipulation of the futures market at the expense of farmers’
income should be denounced in the strongest terms” (Peña, 2020, para. 3 and 7). This
accusation became a further dent on the reputation of Hershey, who have come under
increasing pressure for their roles in child labour and deforestation in the cocoa sector in both
countries. Moreover, Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire also reiterated the volatile relationship
between poorer nations producing cocoa beans and companies selling finished products to
wealthier customers over the years. According to both countries, “some chocolatiers and
trade houses have adopted covert strategies to circumvent the farmer income improvement
mechanism with the aim of collapsing it” (Almeida, Mieu and Bassompierre, 2020, para.5).
They stated that they would do whatever is within their power to protect the over three
million farmers from poverty (Almeida, Mieu and De Bassompierre, 2020, para. 5).
In a separate statement signed by the Director General of the CCC, Côte D’Ivoire also
accused Mars Incorporated of migrating the bulk of its cocoa butter purchases to its
traditional processors, buying from JB Cocoa and Guan Chong Berhad instead to circumvent
paying the LID. Again, the two countries asserted that Olam International Incorporated, the
third largest cocoa processor in the world, is pursuing a strategy of reducing the amount of
Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire cocoa beans from its recipes. Based on what the two countries state
is an attempt to derail and undermine the LID, they stated that they were reviewing their
membership of the Federation of Cocoa Commerce (FCC) in London, which is a UK-based
international organisation that aims to promote, protect and regulate cocoa trade, and that
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they are “reconsidering the incentives and licenses granted to members of the FCC which are
directly or subtly rejecting the LID” (Almeida, Mieu and De Bassompierre, 2020, para. 21).
Similarly, Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire withdrew their membership of a United States industry
association, which is the Cocoa Merchants Association of America (CMAA), accusing them
of colluding and condoning with American chocolate companies against poor West African
cocoa farmers, by avoiding payment of the LID (Almeida, Mieu and De Bassompierre, 2020,
para. 13).
This altercation between the two major cocoa producing countries and the two lead
firms in the United States over the payment of the LID is a clear manifestation of the power
and political struggles within the cocoa GVC. As my analysis on cocoa GVC demonstrates,
the main reason why lead firms merge or acquire other deals within the cocoa value chain is
to increase their influence, so they can decide how value is distributed. The interest of lead
firms in the cocoa GVC has never been whether the profits and cost saving deals that arise
out of the deals they engage in pass onto the smallholder cocoa farmers. The main objective
behind the market power and concentration is for lead firms to continue to expand their profit
opportunities, while exploring new ones. I contend that major producing countries including
Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire have important roles to play in cushioning their cocoa farmers from
the politics and power of the cocoa GVC, whereby smallholder farmers are unable to hold
any countervailing power against huge lead firms in the cocoa processing, manufacturing and
retailing segments of the cocoa GVC. In effect, aside from the cocoa beans production
segment of the cocoa GVC, the remaining four segments are controlled by cocoa and
chocolate lead firms and their agents, who are stationed either outside or within major
producing countries in West Africa.
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In addition, the attempt by Hershey and Mars Incorporated to derail and undermine
the LID, and the recent attempt by the European Union (EU) to boycott cocoa from Ghana,
after the implementation of the LID, over so-called child labour and environmental concerns
bring into sharp focus the historical context of Ghana in terms of power and sovereignty, and
how cocoa prices in the past were used by some powerful countries in the Global North to
disturb and distort national development in Ghana. For example, the United States
government, working through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was determined to
overthrow the Nkrumah government before he could achieve his cherished hopes of African
unity. Collaborating with their international allies such as Great Britain and Canada, the
United States financed, masterminded and guided the coup d’etat of 24th February, 1966.
According to the U.S State Department, Kwame Nkrumah had an overpowering desire to
replicate his brand of nationalism in other African states, making Ghana, in their view, one of
the foremost practitioners of subversion in Africa. The United States was uncomfortable with
the offensive the Nkrumah administration was waging against apartheid in South Africa,
providing money and training to freedom fighters in the African National Congress (ANC),
which was determined to overthrow the white supremacist regime. Therefore, in years
leading up to the 1966 coup d’etat in Ghana, the U.S State Department withheld several loans
to Ghana and worked with their international allies in the Global North to arbitrarily lower
the prices of cocoa on the international market through stockpiling in order to deprive the
Nkrumah government and Ghanaian cocoa farmers of needed revenue and foreign exchange.
This decline in prices was caused by the manipulations of big chocolate trusts in Britain and
the United States (Quist-Adade, 2021, para. 2-5).
Consequently, the real conspiracy that brought Nkrumah down, and which continued
after the coup d’etat was the catastrophic decline in the prices of cocoa. From a peak of over
$1000 per metric tonne in the 1957-1958 crop season, the prices of cocoa dropped to $504
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per metric tonne in the 1963-1964 crop year, and further down to as low as $210 per metric
tonne in 1966 (Vallin, 1966, para. 11). This decline in prices of cocoa came after a period
during which manufacturers were encouraged to expand their production, with the assurance
from the government that they could count on prices between $560 and $700 per metric tonne
at least up to 1970. As of July 1966, the price of Ghana’s cocoa for shipment between August
and September was being quoted at $245 per metric tonne, and as a result, the many millions
of pounds invested into improvement schemes and disease control earned nothing in return
(Vallin, 1966, para. 12). This catastrophic decline was caused by the manipulation of the big
chocolate companies in Britain and the United States through the artificial stockpiling of
cocoa beans. It is important to state that, after the overthrow of Nkrumah, the prices of cocoa
rose again from $488 per metric tonne to $499.66 per metric tonne, even though it did not
reach the minimum of $560 per metric tonne sought by the Ghanaian people. In any case, the
damage to Ghana had already been done. The collapse of cocoa prices bankrupted the
Ghanaian economy, reduced the quality of life of the Ghanaian people, especially farmers and
workers, and ended in the collapse of the Nkrumah administration  (Vallin, 1966, para. 15).
4.6 THE LID AND THE POVERTY LINE IN GHANA
I agree with Hutz-Adams that there is a huge gap between prices received by cocoa farmers
and the cost they incur in production, which is a burden on them and the environment. Some
NGOs like “True Price” even put the cost of production of cocoa farmers at nearly four times
the prices cocoa farmers receive at the farmgate. It is true that, even though cocoa farmer’s
income depend on four core metrics: cost of production, quantity of produce, farmgate price
and quality of produce, there are also other aspects to a living income like living needs,
amount of dependents, amount of workers or income providers in the family, and household
food production. Notwithstanding these important points of production costs and farmgate
prices, I will also argue that the LID of $400 per metric tonne is in line with Living Income
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Benchmark estimates in rural cocoa growing communities of Ghana, which is pegged at
about $329 per month for a typical family of two adults and three children (Smith and
Sarpong, 2018, p. 4). According to a report of cocoa producing areas in Ghana, presented by
Sally Smith and Daniel Sarpong (2018), the Living Income benchmark of 1,464 cedis ($329)
is based on the actual cost of living in March 2018, at a basic standard of decency and
indicates the amount of profit from all sources of household income that would be necessary
to cover living expenses for the family. They used the Anker methodology for estimating
costs of living, which includes putting together separate estimates of (i) low-cost nutritious
diet, (ii) basic decent healthy housing and (iii) all other essential needs including education of
children through secondary school, decent healthcare, transportation, clothing, re-creation
and personal care. Additionally, a small margin above this total cost is added to provide
unforeseen events such as illness and accidents or special occasions like funerals and
marriages, to ensure families do not easily fall into poverty (Sally and Sarpong, 2018, p. 4).
The table below gives a breakdown of Living Income benchmark for a family of 2 adults and
3 children in rural cocoa growing regions of Ghana (Ashanti, Central, Eastern, and Western
regions). It demonstrates that 52 percent of the costs of living are food, 13 percent of the
costs are housing, 30 percent of the costs are other essential needs and 5 percent for
sustainability.
Figure 4: Breakdown of Living Income benchmark for rural cocoa growing regions of Ghana
(Ashanti, Central, Eastern, and Western regions). Source: Sally and Sarpong (2018).
Item GHS per month USD per month
Food costs per month 757 170
Housing costs per month 198 44
Non-food, non-housing costs 439 99
Additional 5% for sustainability and emergencies 70 16
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Total costs per month of basic, but decent living
standard for family of 2 adults and 3 children
1464 329
Therefore, considering the Living income estimate of $329 per month for a family
two adults and three children as stated by Smith and Sarpong in March 2018 or the Living
Income estimate of $312 per household per month as stated by the LICoP in March 2020, it
can be concluded that the $400 per metric tonne is in accordance with Living Income
estimates in Ghana, and as such, sufficient enough to enable cocoa farmers in Ghana cater for
the welfare needs of their families and workers. Although there is no debating the fact that
cocoa farmers in Ghana should preferably earn more for their labour, considering their costs
of production, I also contend that, in a global cocoa market, where the forces of demand and
supply are always at play, Ghana should not be seen over-pricing its commodity in a way that
makes buyers seek other sources of cocoa supply, as we are beginning to see chocolate lead
firms like Hershey and Mars Incorporated do. Already, there are even reports of cocoa glut in
Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire because these big agricultural trading houses and cocoa exporters in
both countries are switching to cheaper contracts for later delivery and buying less to cut
inventories, all in a bid to circumvent the payment of the LID.
4.7 CONCLUSION
The main argument of this thesis is that the cocoa GVC is largely concentrated and integrated
in the hands of a few and giant lead firms in ways that reduce the market power and influence
for smallholder farmers, who are assigned the role of remote and small price-takers. With the
unfair and unethical nature of the cocoa GVC along with the constant power and political
struggles, smallholder farmers in cocoa producing countries are unable to attain higher and
fairer prices for their output. Although most interviewees held the view that the LID of $400
per metric tonne is crucial to enable cocoa farmers cater for the welfare needs of their
families and workers, major industry players like the Cocoa Barometer and the VOICE
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Network maintain that the LID could have been much higher, taking into consideration the
costs of production and other important factors that go into cocoa production in Ghana. This
notwithstanding, I contend that, for a start, the LID is a realistic policy, as it is in line with
most Living Income estimates in Ghana.
Firstly, the LID can serve as a value-based imperative to ensure the fundamental
human rights to a decent livelihood. The preamble to the founding documents of the
International Labour Organisation in 1919 declares the necessity for a “payment adequate to
maintain a reasonable standard of living that is understood in their time and country”.
Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “just and favourable
remuneration” is a primary right, not just to the labourer, but also for the labourer's family.
The United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights is even
more specific, pronouncing a “decent living for themselves and their family” a basic right.
Furthermore, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights state that
it is the duty of governments to protect people from human rights violations, and that it is the
responsibility of organisations to respect these human rights (Fountain and Hütz-Adam, 2014,
p. 1).
Secondly, the LID will make known a definitive income level, which attracts farmers
to continue to grow cocoa, and importantly attract young people into cocoa farming.
Consequently, the LID is a business imperative if cocoa production is to be sustainable. The
initiative offers a reliable base to develop projects, which guarantees a sustainable supply of
cocoa. With a viable guaranteed minimum price, cocoa farmers will not, as the trend shows,
change crops or abandon their farms as soon as they see other opportunities, and the youth
will be interested in taking over the family farm. There is a common notion that in order to
ensure future supply for cocoa, it is imperative to make cocoa farming an attractive business.
Of the numerous sustainability programs in the cocoa sector, it is only a living income
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guaranteed by price regulation that considers the basic needs or expected net income of
farmers’ calculations based on household size and real income needs. In other words, the
initiative of a guaranteed minimum price largely makes farmers better business people, able
to adequately cater for the welfare needs of their dependents and workers (Fountain and
Hütz-Adam, 2014, p. 1).
In the final analysis, my argument is that the LID proposed by Ghana is in the social,
economic and business interests of cocoa farmers. This is because for the first time in the
history of cocoa production, the LID completely reforms the way global cocoa is priced,
which beforehand was completely decided on the cocoa terminal market. The LID will serve
as a buffer for cocoa farmers, which not only enhances the income they receive at the
farmgate level, but also drives cocoa production by employing more workers, particularly the
teeming youth in these cocoa growing communities. The point is that cocoa farmers in Ghana
use two acres of land and produce half a ton of cocoa beans a season. Farmers will need
workers to clear the land of weeds, with cocoa trees pruned and replanted, if necessary. In
effect, the LID will ensure that they get enough money to pay workers to assist them on their
cocoa farms. Notwithstanding the importance of the LID, as a major starting point on the
conversation of how to raise prices for cocoa farmers, it is also my position that there are
other aspects to a living income such as living needs, amount of dependence, amount of
workers or income providers, and food production, which when considered by the
Governments of Ghana and Côte D’ Ivoire may prove that the $400 per metric tonne is on the
low side. Consequently, all these variables need to be incorporated in arriving at a decent
living income for cocoa farmers, guaranteed by price regulation.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This study examined the viability of the LID, and whether the implementation of this new
policy, which provides an additional premium of $400 per metric tonne to the terminal
market price, will help cocoa farmers in Ghana fight the poverty that has plagued their cocoa
business for years. All of the forty (40) interviewees were of the view that the $400 per
metric tonne amount is not only crucial and socially justifiable, but also central towards
protecting farmers from the historical patterns of exploitation and dominance in the cocoa
GVC. This is because the LID provides both fixed and enhanced income for cocoa farmers.
In their estimation, the $400 per metric tonne amount is a modest beginning in a sector that is
driven by unfair market power and concentration. Most interviewees argued that, even though
the LID of $400 will not entirely resolve the financial challenges of cocoa farmers, moving
forward, the LID will help them make enough savings through which they can adequately
provide for the welfare needs of their households and workers.
5.1 LESSONS
The study presents the following important lessons that are worth considering to achieve
sustainability in the cocoa sector in Ghana in both social and environmental respects.
1. Existing initiatives such as certification schemes and pledges by consumer-countries
to end child labour and deforestation have not yielded effective results in combatting
poverty in the cocoa sector in Ghana (Brack, 2019, p. 21).
2. The vicious cycle of poverty experienced by the millions of cocoa farmers and
workers in Ghana can be explained by the imperfect and unethical nature of the cocoa
GVC, in which farmers alone have little leverage compared to giant cocoa companies
(Gayi and Tsowou, 2016, p. 1).
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3. Market concentration and power imbalances are glaring and expansive within the
cocoa GVC such that major cocoa producing countries in West Africa, including
Ghana, are unable to influence prices through market mechanisms alone when
confronted by a very few and giant lead firms in Europe and North America (Gayi
and Tsowou, 2016, p. 1; Leissle, 2018, p. 19).
4. To comprehensively resolve the problem of excessive power and dominance within
the cocoa GVC, every farmer in Ghana should preferably earn a living income
guaranteed by price regulation, which creates a stable economic environment in which
cocoa farmers can have the confidence to invest in their farms including the necessary
and costly replanting of cocoa trees.
5. Fairness, social justice and other sustainability achievements in the cocoa sector in
Ghana ultimately depend on the centrality of guaranteeing a viable minimum price for
smallholder cocoa farmers and workers. The issue of a living income, which is a
human right, is crucial to the survival of the cocoa and chocolate industry. The
payment of fair and higher prices is essential and non-negotiable because of the
impact of the global health pandemic, which has resulted in farmers losing income
and seeing their cost of living rise (Voice Network, 2020, para. 3).
6. Lead firms who are trying to circumvent the LID, which is meant to increase farmgate
prices, with the goal of achieving a living income for cocoa farmers, are not pursuing
the sustainability of the cocoa industry. The sustainability of the cocoa sector depends
on higher prices for cocoa farmers and workers.
7. The introduction and implementation of the LID brings to the fore the crucial role
governments of cocoa producing countries have in securing higher prices for its
farmers and workers. The LID challenges the assumption that the government has no
role to play in determining prices on the global market and that everything should be
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left to the forces of demand and supply. While it is often assumed that West African
cocoa producing governments cannot withstand the power and influence of chocolate
lead firms in the Global North, the implementation of the LID, shows that, to some
extent, they can. It remains to be seen if they can resolve the disputes with major
players such as Hershey and Mars Incorporated, but so far, the evidence shows that
the two West African governments are unwavering about the LID project, and are
prepared to push back against the dominance of huge chocolate companies in the
cocoa GVC.
8. Although market power and concentration may lead to efficiency and better
economies of scale on the part of some lead firms in Europe and North America, the
fact is that these economic benefits, accruing from the cocoa value chain, have not
been passed onto cocoa farmers in producing countries.
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
Over the years, multiple stakeholders have introduced different initiatives as a way of
confronting the problems of inadequate farmgate prices, hazardous child labour and
deforestation in the cocoa sector. Irrespective of these existing initiatives and their clear
limitations such as certification schemes and consumer-country pledges, there is still no
visible and significant impact in the cocoa sector. Therefore, for cocoa in Ghana to be
sustainable for farmers and workers, they must earn a living income. A living income
guaranteed by price regulation is a comprehensive solution to the problem of market
concentration and unfairness within the cocoa global value chain, in which smallholder cocoa
farmers are not properly integrated because only a few lead firms control the distribution of
wealth, and decide prices within the supply chain.
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Altogether, the cocoa industry, producers and governments should maintain the
human rights of farmers and wellbeing as a top priority in all issues of cocoa prices. The
payment of higher and viable prices to cocoa farmers is essential to the sustainability and
growth of the industry. Chocolate lead firms in Europe and North America should refrain
from short-changing farmers and those in authority, and should not punish companies in a
way that is detrimental to the livelihood of cocoa farmers. It is imperative for stakeholder in
the industry, who indeed want to eradicate the incidence of child labour, deforestation and
malnutrition among cocoa families, should be demonstrably involved in processes to enhance
farmgate prices, with the objective to achieve better farm gate prices. The minimum the
over-$100 billion-chocolate-industry can do to alleviate the suffering and desperation of
cocoa farmers is to pay the LID of $400 per metric tonne.
The following recommendations are proposed to ensure that the cocoa business becomes
sustainable for farmers in Ghana and globally:
1. There is the need for stakeholders in the cocoa, especially at the global level, not only
to implement changes at the technical level, but they must also tackle issues of power
and political economy within the cocoa GVC.
2. There is the need to facilitate debate and concrete action regarding the extensive
market concentration and resulting power imbalances within the cocoa supply chain,
especially with regard to the position of smallholder farmers and traders. Aside from
the issue of market concentration at the international level, it is important to state that
market concentration happens both at the regional and state levels.
3. The Government of Ghana should ensure transparency and accountability in the
management of the Stabilisation Fund. Cocoa farmers should be adequately and
involved in the management of the stabilisation fund. They should be updated on how
proceeds from the fund are transferred to cocoa farmers. The involvement of farmers
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in these discussions is important, as this assists in the smooth implementation of the
policy.
4. Even though it is commendable that the Governments of Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire
have set up a stabilisation fund into which extra proceeds from the LID will be paid,
the application of those funds should be tailored specifically towards the welfare
needs of cocoa farmers and their families and workers. For example, in Ghana, more
needs to be done to improve cocoa roads and other key infrastructure in the country,
especially in cocoa growing communities in the Western enclave of the country,
where the bulk of the cocoa beans are produced.
5. The duty of paying farmers a living income guaranteed by price regulation should not
be left to the two major producing countries alone, other cocoa producing countries in
West Africa like Cameroun and Nigeria should equally support the principle of the
LID and the practice of paying cocoa farmers more. It is only when all cocoa
producing countries in West Africa come together as a single bloc, can they bargain
for better prices for their farmers and workers.
5.3 CONCLUSION
In summary, the LID challenges the assumptions in the cocoa sector about the ability of
stakeholders, particularly, producing governments to change the way cocoa is priced and
traded to the benefits of cocoa farmers. Ghana and Côte D'Ivoire have proven that cocoa
prices cannot always be left to the forces of demand and supply, which does not guarantee
stable and fair prices for cocoa farmers and workers. It is imperative to restate that, whereas it
is widely argued that West African cocoa producing governments cannot withstand the
power, influence and control of TNCs in the Global North, the implementation of the LID
demonstrates that they can fight for the welfare needs of their farmers and workers, who
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APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
Broad Protocol of Interview Questions
I will briefly describe the study, my position, and the purpose of the interview. Both the
participants and I will sign the informed consent form.
Questions for State Officials and Cocoa Farmers
Closed Questions
1. Have you heard about the decision by the Government of Ghana to introduce a Living
Income Differential of $400?
2. Is the Living Income Differential of $400 a good policy for cocoa farmers?
3. Is the Living Income Differential of $400 enough to support cocoa farmers and their
families and workers?
4. Will the Living Income Differential of $400 make cocoa farming more sustainable
for farmers and workers?
Open Questions
5. How different is the Living Income Differential policy from other policies initiated by
the Government of Ghana over the years in the cocoa sub-sector?
6. How will the Living Income Differential policy change or impact farmgate prices for
cocoa farmers since they are not directly involved?
7. In what way, do you think the Living Income Differential of $400 will improve your
living condition as a cocoa farmer?
8. How will the Living Income Differential help the cocoa farming business become
more sustainable?




10. The Living Income Differential of $400 set by the Government of Ghana is enough to
help farmers achieve a living income.
Strongly Disagree        Disagree        Neutral Agree        Strongly Agree
11. The Living Income Differential of $400 will support cocoa farmers to cater for
themselves and their families and workers.
Strongly Disagree         Disagree        Neutral Agree        Strongly Agree
12. The Living Income Differential of $400 will make cocoa farming more sustainable for
farmers and workers.
Strongly Disagree         Disagree        Neutral Agree        Strongly Agree
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APPENDIX II: INFORMED CONSENT FORM
“Politics, power and unfair market concentration in the cocoa Global Value Chain (GVC):
Analysing the prospects of the Living Income Differential (LID) for achieving a just and
sustainable livelihood for cocoa farmers in Ghana”
Name of Principal Investigator: Boakye Richard
Department: International Development Studies
Email: boakyerichard1114@gmail.com/Boakye.Richard@smu.ca
Phone number: +1 (782) 234 6758
SMU REB#20-068
INTRODUCTION
As a graduate student at Saint Mary’s University, I would like to invite you to participate in
this research project in fulfilment of my Master’s Thesis research requirement under the
supervision of Dr. Gavin Fridell, Canada Research Chair in International Development and
Associate Professor. The research project seeks to explore the political and social reasons
why Ghana has taken the initiative to regulate a higher floor price for cocoa on the global
commodity market. I will analyze and use the data solely for the purpose of this study.
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH
Ghana has been producing Cocoa for decades now. The country is the second largest
producer of cocoa in the world, behind the Ivory Coast. According to the World Bank, the
cocoa sector in Ghana employs over one million Ghanaian farmers and workers. The two
West African countries put together contribute about 60-65 percent of global cocoa supply,
the main ingredient used in producing chocolate and other confectionery products. Early last
year, the two countries undertook an initiative to regulate a higher floor price for cocoa,
which is pegged at $2600 per tonne, below which they are not going to sell. The decision by
the two countries takes effect in October 2020 for the approaching 2020/21 crop season.
Importantly, the plan by the two countries is set to be among the biggest changes to the global
cocoa market in decades. The purpose of the study is to examine the social and political
factors that influenced Ghana into taking such a major decision. Besides that, I will seek to
investigate whether the mechanism of a floor price is sufficient to raise the incomes of cocoa
farmers and workers to something akin to a living wage. The research will seek to ascertain
from state officials, non-governmental stakeholders, and major players in the cocoa industry
as to the rationale and social and political motivations behind such a historic decision, after
years of cocoa production. As a result, for my Master of Arts research it is important to
explore two main questions. First, what are the main political and social reasons behind the
decision to initiate a floor price in Ghana for 2020? Second, what are the possible benefits
and challenges that the floor price offers for promoting living wages and human development
in the cocoa sector?
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In this research methodology, interviews and focus group discussions will be used. The
researcher will make sense of the data by using content analysis to analyze and verify results.
The avoidance of asking very sensitive questions, and being open and honest about the
purpose of the research will be adhered to at all stages. The empirical basis of this study is
primary and secondary data. Primary data will come from interviews and focus group
discussions; specifically the research will seek to interview thirty (30) participants,
irrespective of gender or ethnicity. The secondary sources of data will include government
publications, journals, periodicals, research papers, papers presented by scholars. The
secondary information will be used to complement the primary data in order to enhance the
validity and reliability of the findings. The results from the interviews will be transcribed and
analyzed using content analysis.
LOCATION: Accra and Kyebi Amanfrom, both in the Greater Accra Region and the Eastern
Region of Ghana respectively.
WHO IS BEING INVITED TO PARTICIPATE?
A sampling of state officials, non-governmental stakeholders, industry representatives in the
cocoa sub-sector, and cocoa farmers in Ghana will be invited to participate. You may
participate in this study if you are at least 18 years old, and regardless of gender or ethnicity.
EXPECTED DURATION OF THE RESEARCH AND OF PARTICIPANTS
The fieldwork is expected to take place between 1st June, 2020 and 31st July 2020.
Participants’ involvement will end with the interview, unless they request a summary of the
final results by email by consenting to be re-contacted and providing an electronic address.
WHAT DOES PARTICIPATING MEAN?
If you consent to participate, you will be asked to take part in a single interview, which you
can expect to last for thirty minutes. For the interview:
· While full anonymity cannot be guaranteed, only the researcher will know your name,
which will not be included in any public material unless the person interviewed requests
otherwise.
● you may choose to answer or not answer any questions
● you may choose to end the interview at any time
● you may have your interview withdrawn from the study at any time
● after the initial interview, you can determine any future involvement with the study
and may withdraw at any time.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF THIS RESEARCH?
Participant involvement is done on a strictly voluntary basis. The research will provide an
important basis for advancing knowledge on price regulation and the developmental state.
The study will explore the reasons why Ghana, after decades of cocoa production, has
decided to set a floor price for the commodity on the international market. Besides that, the
study will highlight the political and social factors influencing such a decision by the state,
and will finally ascertain whether the instrument of price regulation alone is sufficient to
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reduce poverty and inequality amongst farmers and workers in the cocoa sector. The research
is intended to contribute to knowledge on the topic and to be of use to a range of policy
advisors, advocacy groups, and stakeholders at the national and international level.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS FOR PARTICIPANTS?
There are no anticipated risks for participation in this study, and participants will not be asked
to participate in any activity that may result in harm or will put them in a vulnerable position
legally or otherwise. This research is not being done for purposes of commercialization, and
there are no known conflicts of interest on the part of the student principal investigator and
the university. Again, this research for the MA thesis is being done by a student principal
researcher who is independent and without any connections whatsoever to the cocoa industry.
If you feel that there are additional risks, or that potential concerns or conflicts of interest
might exist, please discuss them with the student principal investigator either at the interview
or after it is over (at boakyerichard1114@gmail.com/Boakye.Richard@smu.ca).
HOW CAN I WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY?
You may withdraw at any time, by informing the student principal investigator either in
person or after the interview is over (at
boakyerichard1114@gmail.com/Boakye.Richard@smu.ca). Your interview will be removed
from the study. Should you request to be removed at a time after publications have come out,
your information will not be included in any future publications or work of any kind.
WHAT WILL BE DONE WITH MY INFORMATION?
Direct quotes and summaries of the interview will be used to write this MA thesis and any
other academic work such as papers for publication in academic journals, newspapers,
magazines, blogs, conference presentations, reports, research grant applications, and books.
However, I must state that it is not possible for participants to have the chance to review the
transcript after the interview. The raw data will be available to both the faculty supervisor and
the student principal investigator in the course of the MA thesis. The raw data will be stored
safely in the possession of the student principal investigator on his Personal Computer, which
has a secured password and will not be shared with anyone else. Again, there are other
options for the storage of the data like SMU’s OneDrive, Google Drive and Apple iCloud.
The interview will be anonymized (only the researcher will know your name, which will not
be included in any public material) unless the person being interviewed requests otherwise.
After five years of the initial interview, the data will be destroyed in a manner ensuring
privacy.
HOW CAN I GET MORE INFORMATION?
If you would like to be informed on new publications as they emerge from the research,
please let the student principal investigator know. For any further information or queries,
please contact:
Boakye Richard
Department of International Development Studies
Saint Mary’s University, 923 Robie Street, Halifax, NS B3H 3C3
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Phone: +1 (782) 234 6578
Email: boakyerichard1114@gmail.com/Boakye.Richard@smu.ca
CERTIFICATION:
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Saint Mary’s University Research
Ethics Board. If you have any questions or concerns about ethical matters, you may contact
the Chair of the Saint Mary's University Research Ethics Board at ethics@smu.ca or 011
(902) 420-5728.
AUDIO-RECORDED INTERVIEW
Would you be willing to allow the interview to be recorded? (Please check preference):
Yes, you can record the interview ____
No, you cannot record the interview ____
SIGNATURE OF AGREEMENT:
I understand what this study is about and appreciate the risks and benefits. I have had
adequate time to think about this and have had the opportunity to ask questions. I understand




APPENDIX III: VERBAL CONSENT SCRIPT
“Politics, power and unfair market concentration in the cocoa Global Value Chain (GVC):
Analysing the prospects of the Living Income Differential (LID) for achieving a just and
sustainable livelihood for cocoa farmers in Ghana”
Name of Principal Investigator: Boakye Richard
Department: International Development Studies
Email: boakyerichard1114@gmail.com/Boakye.Richard@smu.ca
Phone number: +1 (782) 234 6758
SMU REB#20-068
Good Day Sir/Madam,
My name is Richard Boakye of Saint Mary’s University, Halifax NS, Canada. I am carrying
out research as part of the requirements before I graduate from a Master’s program. My
supervisor is Dr. Gavin Fridell. The research is to explore the reasons why Ghana, after
decades of cocoa production, would decide to set a floor price for the commodity on the
international market, and I want to kindly request you join as one of the participants for the
interview/focus group discussions. Whatever answers you give will be important for the
study and remain confidential as your names and positions will not be revealed upon request.
Again, the information you give will be solely used for the purpose of this study. The
interview/ focus group discussions will take place at your weekly meeting place between the
17th and 30th of July, 2020 for about thirty minutes. If you are participating in the focus group
discussion, it will take close to two hours because there will be a maximum of eight people
involved in the discussions. Additionally, anyone can withdraw if you do not want to
continue or you can skip any question that makes you uncomfortable. However, after
publications the information cannot be withdrawn and will be submitted to Saint Mary’s
University. If you want the results of the study, let me know how I can send it to you. In case
you want to reach me, my phone number is +1 (782) 234 6758. You can send me a text with
details on how I will send it to you. Thank you for your time and agreeing to take part in this
study.
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES, DATES AND LOCATIONS
1. JOSEPH OPOKU GAKPO 25TH JUNE, 2020 ACCRA, GHANA
2. TOMA IMIHERE 8TH JULY, 2020 ACCRA, GHANA
3. STEPHENSON ANNANE
BOATENG 26TH APRIL, 2021
KUMASI, GHANA
4. KWAME ASAFO ADJEI 16TH JULY, 2020 NSUTA, KWAMANG,
BEPOSO, GHANA
5. SAMPSON AHI 30TH JUNE, 2020 BODI, GHANA
6. FIIFI BOAFO 29TH JUNE, 2020 ACCRA, GHANA
7. SAMUEL KWAKYE
ANEFI
26TH APRIL, 2021 KUMASI, GHANA
8. IMORO SEIDU 26TH APRIL, 2021 TARKWA BREMAN,
GHANA
9. JOYCE ADWOA AKOH
DEI
26TH APRIL, 2021 BOSOME-FREHO,
GHANA
10. BISMARK ATINBIRI 26TH APRIL, 2021 ACCRA, GHANA
11. FRANK OKYERE 26TH APRIL, 2021 KUMASI, GHANA
12. RICHARD ASARE 26TH APRIL, 2021 KUMASI, GHANA
13. RICHMOND FRIMPONG 27TH APRIL, 2021 KUMASI, GHANA
14. GNACOFA
CONSULTANT
26TH APRIL, 2021 ACCRA, GHANA
15. BRIGHT ASARE 26TH APRIL, 2021 NKAWKAW, GHANA
16. MICHAEL OKWAMPA 26TH APRIL, 2021 NKAWKAW, GHANA
17. JONATHAN OFORI 26TH APRIL, 2021 KUMASI, GHANA
18. ASENSO MENSAH 26TH APRIL, 2021 NKAWKAW, GHANA




27TH APRIL, 2021 ADANKWAME,
GHANA
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21. NANA OSEI 27TH APRIL, 2021 AHAFO, GHANA
22. KWAME ASARE BOADU 27TH APRIL, 2021 KUMASI, GHANA
23. NII LAMPTEY 27TH APRIL, 2021 SOMANYA, GHANA
24. WILLIAM AMANKWAH 27TH APRIL, 2021 BIA WEST, GHANA
25. BAAFO AWUAH 27TH APRIL, 2021 KUMASI, GHANA
26. MICHAEL AMU 28TH APRIL, 2021 SEFWI AKONTOMBRA,
GHANA
27. PETER BOADI 28TH APRIL, 2021 KUMASI, GHANA
28. NANA APEDWAHENE
ANIM
28TH APRIL, 2021 KUMASI, GHANA
29. ADU KWESI 28TH APRIL, 2021 AKUEASI, GHANA
30. STEPHEN KWEKU
YEBOAH
28TH APRIL, 2021 ABIRIM, GHANA
31. JOSEPH BOATENG 28TH APRIL, 2021 KADEWESO, GHANA
32. ASANA SULEIMANA 29TH APRIL, 2021 ADANKWAME, GHANA
33. NYARKO AMOAH 29TH APRIL, 2021 AJUMAKO, GHANA
34. MICHAEL YEBOAH
BOATENG
29TH APRIL, 2021 ADUMASA, GHANA
35. NOAH FOSU MANU 29TH APRIL, 2021 KUMASI, GHANA
36. ERNESTINA ODUM 29TH APRIL, 2021 ADUMASA, GHANA
37. AUNTE MARY 29TH APRIL, 2021 ADUMASA, GHANA
38. OSMANU DAUDA 29TH APRIL, 2021 KUMASI, GHANA
39. WILLIAM ANTWI
NUAMAH
29TH APRIL, 2021 KROFROM, GHANA
40. MICHAEL ADOMAKO 29TH APRIL, 2021 KUMASI, GHANA
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